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"When the marriage relationship has completely and finally broken down and the relations of the parties have reached an impasse
where reconciliation is impossible and the family unit has ceased to
exist, no rule or regulation promulgated by authority of the state can
restore it."'
"[E]ight years is a long time in a world where life is short.' 2
I. INTRODUCTON
Twentieth-century American divorce has displayed a gaggle of
radically competing norms and operations. Divorce statutes everywhere confined marriage behind a tall legal fence which limited dissolution to cases demonstrating proof of a serious assault on the marital vows between wife and husband. However, one-half of all Ameri*
Associate Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law. J.D., MA,
1977, Ph.D. 1993, University of Virginia. E-mail: <LAWJHD@HOFSTRAEDU>. My
thanks to Professor Charles McCurdy and Professor Walter Wadlington, as well as to my
research assistant, Heather Golin, all of whom have helped me sort through the complex
issues involved in any historical discussion of divorce.
1.
Howay v. Howay, 74 Idaho 492, 501, 264 P.2d 691, 697 (1953).
2.
William Seagle, The Right to Consolation, 2 AM. MERCURY 39, 41 (1924)
(referring to Washington State's living-apart law which permitted divorce upon proof that
the couple had been separated for eight years).
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can legislatures also nominally broadened the divorcing apparatus to
encompass breakdowns caused merely by separation over long periods
of time, or even by that statutory amoeba, "temperamental incompatibility."' Appellate courts often restricted these fault-free alternatives, pronouncing instead a vision of divorce law which emphasized
the overall stability of domestic life in American society as it struggled
to cope with the occasional seismic shudders that tore apart many
families.
A look at the quotidian practices of divorce courts throughout
most of the century reveals a quite different legal universe, one more
attuned to the fissures in American domesticity. Trial judges mediated between the formal requirements of their appellate masters and
the surging mass of insistent divorce-minded litigants. Finally, the
scripted courtroom behavior of most divorcing wives and husbands
played scenes from an adversary theater of the absurd. Wives usually
breathlessly testified to their husbands' domestic beastliness, while
their spouses almost always passed up their right to respond, many
waiting outside the courtroom door for their freshly divorced ex-wives
to bring them the good news of the liberating decree they had conspired to obtain.
At bottom, this disjointed portrait of American divorce presents
the paradox of different arenas for processing marital dissolutions.
These cultural and legal spheres sometimes intersected and at other
times remained parallel as if oblivious to its rivals' existence. Each of
these arenas produced law, carved out a cultural territory with distinct rules, patterns of behavior, constituencies, and goals, and
changed over time, at its own rate. The two generations that lived between the end of World War I and the spread of California-style nonfault divorce in the 1970s both created and were victimized by this
geometric madness, in which the Euclidean universe of divorce law
and culture imploded, leading to today's calls for retrenchment and
legislative proposals reintroducing fault divorce.
This article focuses on the legal and cultural history of non-fault
divorce alternatives, and examines both formal legal materials and
popular periodicals in an effort to comprehend the evolution of the
modern American divorce culture. Beginning in the 1920s, the concept
of incompatibility resounded through popular psychology as well as
jurisprudence. The expansion of the divorce ground of cruelty to include mental anguish was not an attempt to broaden divorce grounds,
but rather an attempt to define the range of the existing cruelty principle in terms of the new psychological understanding. Divorces had
infiltrated the burgeoning consumer culture, and the voices of the
3.

See infra notes 210-24 and accompanying text.
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trial judges sliced through the thick web of formal divorce grounds
and defenses. In the following decade, legislatures responded to the
new divorce freedom with a veritable boom in state statutes proffering
non-fault divorce alternatives. While a surface reading of these "living
apart" and 'incompatibility" laws suggests a legislative design to
lower the hurdles for divorcing couples, a look beneath reveals an opposite agenda. These early non-fault reforms were in fact efforts to
slow down the rate of divorce, reflecting legislative awareness that
the sandbags of fault had seriously eroded. The popular reaction to
these non-fault progenitors was not, however, what the legislatures
had hoped. The number of intended consumers who purchased their
marital freedom in the new statutory fashion remained negligible.
Nor did the legislative reforms find universal favor among appellate
courts, which often had difficulty interpreting these novel texts except
within the fault-oriented matrix of traditional divorce procedures.
This tortuous history of fault and no-fault divorce may well prove instructive in this new age in which no-fault may be ceding its grip to
the voices clamoring for a revival of fault norms to again slow down
divorce.
II. THE POPULAR ARENA OF DIVORCE
Arthur Garfield Hays described divorce in the 1920s as a
"beating of wings against a cage - an endeavor to obtain a legal paper with a red seal which will avoid a situation which two people find
intolerable."4 He was a prominent civil rights lawyer who served as
counselor for the American Civil Liberties Union and participated in
such notable trials as the Scopes evolution trial in the 1920s and the
race-baiting Scottsboro trial a decade later. Divorced in 1924, his personal experience triggered a flurry of publications on the subject. He
took an aggressive stance, condemning the immorality of any couple
who stayed married after they no longer loved each other. In New
Moralsfor Old: Modern Marriageand Ancient Laws,5 Hays contrasted
the cultural hare with the statutory tortoise. Anyone who supported
divorce on demand, he remarked, was castigated as "a wrecker of our
Arthur Garfield Hays, New Morals for Old: Modern Marriage and Ancient
4.
Laws, 119 NATION 187, 188 (1924). Hays later insisted in his memoirs that "no social
purpose is served by dragooning two people into intimate relationship where they have
grown indifferent to or hate each other, and that it is morally indefensible to maintain a
marriage relation by legal statute where the real emotional bonds between the couple no
longer exist." ARTHUR GARFIELD HAYs, CITY LAWYERS: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A LAW
PRACTICE 179 (1942). Similarly, in The Divorce Laws of America and Europe, 20 CURRENT
HIST. 249, 250 (1924), Nancy M. Schoonmaker remarked that Americans are "at last fully
convinced" that laws will not force people to remain married when they wish to divorce.
Hays, New Morals, supra note 4.
5.
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institutions."' But society was edging closer and closer to pure individualism, and Hays saw nothing beneficial in holding on to the cultural husk while morality evolved into another form. "Revolutionary
changes occur unnoticed," he announced, "while our delusions persist
and our sense of conservatism is gratified."
A. In Sync: The New Psychology, The New Jurisprudence, and
Marital Incompatibility
Boston Probate Judge Robert Grant, frequent contributor to the
popular press, noted that women's economic emancipation had turned
the test of marital survival into "compatibility."6 However, the problem with an incompatibility standard for divorce, he argued, was that
it made the formal dissolution process "hinge on caprice instead of
some tangible grievance. ' * More than economics was at issue. Judge
Grant viewed women as cultural captains in the campaign to capture
divorce: 'Ifsundering the marriage tie for mere incompatibility is to
involve no social reproach, it will be because the women of the United
States are in favor of it."'1 Women were perceived as the prime agitators for more liberal divorce, not because they were immoral, but because they were self-respecting and would no longer submit to indignities."
Women were indeed the captains of divorce, not only culturally,
but in the courtrooms. Henry R. Carey complained that women's economic freedom allowed an unhappy wife to replace the court as the
judge of what was unbearable. 2 Carey pointed with exasperation to
the fact that over two-thirds of divorce decrees were awarded to
women."3 Since men had access to roughly the same number of divorce
grounds as women, the enormous disparity reflected a strong cultural
preference for women as the vanguard of new divorce values.
Id. at 188.
6.
Id. at 189.
7.
8.
Robert Grant, The Limits of Feminine Independence, 65 SCRIBNERS MAG.ILLUSTRATED 729, 731-32 (1919).
9.
Robert Grant, Marriage and Divorce, 66 SCRIBNERS MAG-ILLUSTRATED
193, 197 (1919).
Robert Grant, A Call to a New Crusade, GOOD HOUSEKEEPING, Sept. 1921,
10.
at 42, 43.
11.
Marriage,Divorce, and the FederalConstitution, 46 WORLD'S WORK 19, 20
(1923).
12.
Henry R. Carey, This Two-Headed Monster-The Family, 156 HARPER'S
MONTHLY 162, 165 (1928). The editors subsequently published a letter critical of articles
similar to Carey's essay which argued that mutual incompatibility was "the one sensible
[divorce] ground," which unfortunately was legally unrecognized. 156 HARPER'S MONTHLY
527 (1928).
13.
Carey, supra note 12, at 165.
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At first glance, the formal requirements of the fault system might
seem to provide the central reason for the wife-as-primary-plaintiff
phenomenon. Only an innocent spouse could receive alimony, and although the "tender years" child custody presumption was in full sway,
the courts still favored 'Innocent" over "guilty" spouses whenever possible. However, alimony was in fact an unbelievably insignificant factor in the cases, and most divorces were legal ratifications of brokered
endings negotiated by the parties themselves. The predominance of
women divorce plaintiffs probably owes more to the rise of cruelty as
the most popular divorce ground and the culturally accurate sense of
most couples that it would be easier for a woman to admit that she
had been slapped by her mate than vice-versa. An anonymous female
contributor to Harper'sdeclared that male gallantry was the cause:
[I]t is in the divorce courts of to-day that chivalry at its most
absurdly romantic is to be found. What were the courtly
sweeps of Elizabethan plumed hats compared to the American
husband automatically permitting an adulterous wife to sue
him for "cruel and barbarous treatment" in order that she may
marry her lover? It is a supreme gesture, daily accepted as a
matter of course. 4
Table 1 confirms the predominant role women achieved as formal initiators of divorce.

Ten Years After The Divorce: I Would Not Divorce Him Now, 165 HARPER'S
14.
MONTHLY 313, 314 (1932).
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Table 116
Percentage of Absolute Divorces and Annulments by Party
Year

Granted To:
Wife
Husband

1867-70

36.0

64.0

1916-20
1921-25
1926-30
1935
1940
1945
1950

32.6
31.8
28.7
26.9
26.0
28.6
27.5

67.4
68.2
71.3
73.1
74.0
71.4
72.5

Despite widespread exposure in fiction and the periodicals, incompatibility did not exist as a statutory divorce ground in the
1920s.16 Spouses in dissolving unions may have perceived irreconcilability as the underlying ground for the divorce, but this truth was
not cognizable in court, where "divorces are obtained for alleged
causes, wholly different from the real causes.1

7

Nancy M. Schoon-

maker called for an end to this dissonance between law and life:
If we insist upon divorce, no matter how our preachers and
teachers rail at us, then certainly the more decently the divorce can be obtained the better for the individuals directly

PAUL H. JACOBSON, AMERICAN MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, 121 tbl.58 (1959).
15.
Not only were women granted decrees twice or thrice as often as men, as the table shows,
but wives were also more successful as divorce plaintiffs than husbands. In 1939, for example, of the 65,740 decrees issued in suits brought by husbands, the men were awarded
the decree 95% of the time (with their wives awarded 5% of the decrees, presumably on
cross-motion). Of the 185,260 decrees issued in actions taken by wives that year, women
were successful 99.5% of the time. Id. at 120, tbl.56.
CHESTER G. VERNIER, 2 AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS § 73, at 65 (1932). In his
16.
influential 1932 compilation of family laws, Professor Chester G. Vernier felt compelled to
advise his audience that "despite any impression to the contrary which [the lay reader]
may have received from the reading of novels and newspapers, no statute now existing
names incompatibility of temper as a cause for absolute divorce." Id. The single exception
could be found in the Territory of the Virgin Islands, which had carried over the divorce
provisions of the Danish law which had formerly governed the territory. See Lester B. Orfield, Divorcefor TemperamentalIncompatibility, 52 MICH. L. REV. 659, 662-63 (1954).
Rollin Lynde Hartt, The Habit of Getting Divorces I: Causes in American
17.
Cities, 48 WORLD'S WORK 403, 407 (1924).
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concerned and for the body social as well. 18
The concept of incompatibility also rang true to a generation bursting
with psychological explanations for all behaviors.
Incompatibility turned the legal rationale for divorce on its head.
The tradition of ecclesiastical and statutory law had deemed divorce a
consequence of certain proscribed behaviors. The nineteenth century
view of divorce had been consonant with orthodox formalism, an ethos
insisting on rigid boundaries for classifying all human behavior and
its legal consequences. In this categorical universe, law served as the
impartial and apolitical police officer. Indeed, nineteenth-century divorce doctrine provided a classic example of legal formalism. A marriage was deemed indissoluble, save when the complainant established /a fault ground. At that point, formal dismemberment of the
union was mandatory. The underlying reality of the marriage was
never the focus of the judicial inquiry. Technical grounds served as
the unrebuttable barometer of the health of the marriage, and their
presence meant its absence, with no occasion provided for the court to
inquire behind the mask of the formal law."9
In a similar vein, the arena of formal divorce was a haven for
logical puzzle making. There are several illustrations of the legal
acrostics. First, courts under the fault regime were occasionally faced
with the prospect of determining whether a single instance of marital
intercourse resulted in condonation by the complainant of a single instance of prior extramarital sex by the defendant, resulting in the latter's immunity from an adultery action. Then, further along the path
of formal divorce law appeared this example: did a post-condonation
violation of the marital vows by the original guilty party constitute a
revival of the earlier fault ground which the condonation had previously rendered unavailable? These conundrums may fairly be characterized as the acrobatics of logic over experience, particularly as
courts sought their resolution in the realm of syllogistic reasoning
rather than in a consideration of the well-being of the flesh-and-blood
marriage at stake.
But the rising tide of psychology flooded over designs which
evaluated an act without examining the motivation of the actor.
Where the formal divorce system stressed logic, the new understanding of divorce evidenced an instrumental basis. In place of the traditional cause-and-effect scheme in which one act of adultery or desertion warranted the penalty of divorce, the emerging psychological in18.
Schoonmaker, supra note 4, at 251.
19.
On orthodox formalism, see MORTON J. HORwriz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERiCAN LAW 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 9-31 (1992), and G. EDWARD
WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 20-37 (1980).
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sight opened the door to innumerable causes and thus questioned the
necessity of any punishment at all.
One significant manifestation of the sloughing off of rule-based
jurisprudence was provided by the invention of the juvenile court. Beginning at the turn of the century, and spreading rapidly across the
nation, juvenile courts embodied the reigning psychological and jurisprudential drift in elevating rehabilitation over punishment, and preferring confession to painstaking proof. Juvenile judges disdained
lawyers, precedents, the adversary process, and rules of any kind.
What mattered in this quintessential revolt against formalism was
the judge's perception of the child's welfare. In a sense, the real force
of incompatibility as a concept may be seen in the fact that some writers actually believed that it was a valid legal ground, and discussed it
accordingly. Historian George L. Koehn, for example, showed his ignorance of formal legal standards in the 1920s by affirming that the
"ambiguous term incompatibility is elastic enough to stretch to any
lengths the plaintiff desires, and to cover likewise those innumerable
cases wherein both agree to disagree and then amicably decide to employ 'incompatibility' as convenient grounds." 0 In sum, the popular
culture acknowledged a non-Euclidean procedure whose coordinates
did not fit within the classical geometry of the legal system. To borrow
the words of Thurman Arnold, such a conflict was a struggle between
"an ideal and a social need not accepted as legitimate or moral."'" This
informal "law" of incompatibility, as developed and ratified by assertive litigants and agreeable trial judges, proved to be the stronger decourts, no
terminant of the fate of unhappy marriages in the divorce
22
matter what the legislatures and appellate courts said.
B. Divorce Courts and Their Consumers
While much of the literature on domestic relations focused on divorce, relatively little described marriage. American laws regulated
marriage quite lightly, and the average citizen could only "Visualize
state regulation of the marriage relationship" through the rules on diGeorge L. Koehn, Is Divorce a Social Menace?, 16 CURRENT HIST. 294, 299
20.
(1922). As late as 1953, sociologist Ray E. Baber noted that newspaper accounts continued
to convey the misleading impression that incompatibility was a widespread legal divorce
ground. RAY E. BABER, MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY 454 (2d ed. 1953).
THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM 365-66 (1937).
21.
Id. J.G. Beamer argued that the American way of divorce illustrated Ar22.
nold's "immoral and undercover organization" which is "accepted and tolerated as a necessary evil." J.G. Beamer, The Doctrine of Recrimination in Divorce Proceedings, 10 U.
KAN. CITY L. REV. 213, 214 (1942) (quoting ARNOLD, supra note 21, at 365). As Albert C.
Jacobs noted in 1936, "[f]ree consent divorce exists in the United States today as fact, not
merely as a phenomenon of the divorce mill, but as the standard practice throughout the
country." Albert C. Jacobs, Attack on Decrees of Divorce,34 MICH. L. REV. 749, 751 (1936).
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vorce 3 Despite its over-arching purpose to preserve marriages, family
law was generally visible to the public only when it regulated their
demise. The three principal statutory divorce grounds - cruelty,
adultery, and desertion - illustrated the murder-of-marriage theory
posited by Protestant theology and adhered to by legislatures and appellate courts attuned to classical legal thought. The canons of divorce
aimed at rewarding the faithful and punishing the offender. Fault
both heated and illuminated formal divorce policy, and divorce
grounds and defenses orbited around the concept of guilt. Rather than
attempt to evaluate the marriage as a whole, divorce law considered
only the statutorily-specified grounds. This narrowness of gaze displayed a systemic bias in favor of an adversary process oriented to24
ward particular incidents of conduct capable of courtroom proof.
Demonstration of a divorce ground led to legal recognition of
marital breakdown. Empirically, this analysis was at best eccentric,
as the advocates of therapeutic divorce would convincingly demonstrate in the following decades. Many marriages were shipwrecked
despite the absence of a legislatively-proscribed ground, and proof of a
single occasion of statutory sin did not necessarily mean that the marriage was doomed. When the conjugal fallout could not be attributed
to a statutory ground, the prevailing theory left the hapless couple legally stranded because the truthful form of action had not been officially approved. On the other hand, thecommission of a predicate act
by one spouse gave the other substantial leverage as to the fate of the
relationship. These power vacuums and struggles were often the unintended consequences of relying on a grounds-based divorce system.
Litigation over grounds represented the fundamental view of
legislatures and appellate courts that divorce was a club with which
to wallop transgressors of social and religious mores. Statutory adultery, desertion, and cruelty furnished specific standards against
which to measure the quality of a marriage. This categorical thinking
indulged the legal proclivity for substituting verifiable pieces for an
interpretive whole.2 5 Writing about the state of American divorce in
the generation prior to the 1920s, historian William O'Neill described
matrimonial litigation as a morality play:
[D]ivorce was comfortingly well-regulated at a time of growing
23.
Fred S. Hall, Marriageand the Law, 160 ANNALs 110, 110 (1933).
24.
See MAX RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE STABILITY, DIVORCE AND THE LAW 3-6
(1972); GLENDA RILEY, DIVORCE: AN AMERICAN TRADITION 14-15 (1991); Timothy B.
Walker, Disarming the Litigious Man: A Glance at Fault and California'sNew Divorce
Legislation, 1 PAC. L.J. 182, 183 (1970).
25.
Walker, supra note 24, at 189-90 & n.23 (citing Charles W. Tenney Jr., Divorce Without Fault: The Next Step, 46 NEB. L. REV. 24, 57 (1967)).
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moral confusion. . . While slackness and moral relativity
seemed everywhere on the increase, the divorce court was one
of the few places where the old beliefs still obtained. There
was a guilty party and an innocent party. The innocent party
was rewarded, the guilty punished, right prevailed over
wrong, and the American verities were reaffirmed. Society at
large might wink at adultery and assorted other breaches of
law, custom, and good taste, but the divorce court did not. In
this sense, divorce, though 26offensive to traditional values, reinforced them all the same.
Before World War I, the issue of whether divorce would permanently
scar or enhance American culture was an open question. As Herbert
Croly phrased the quandary in 1909, in his celebrated The Promise of
American Life, "[p]ublic opinion does not appear to have decided"
whether the prevalence of divorce represented "an abuse or... a fulfillment of the existing institution of marriage." 7
In the 1920s, public opinion decided. Beginning in that decade,
divorce courts faced an avalanche of wives and husbands who demanded nothing less than that the court wink at the wholesale breach
of the fault-driven system of divorce law. Trial judges largely accommodated these commands from below, keeping the blindfold on formal
justice as they opened their eyes to the demands of what Llewellyn
called the "law-consumer."8 This shift away from enduring connubial
woe and toward freer divorce as a positive cultural and psychological
good was consistent with what historian T.J. Jackson Lears described
as "a shift from a Protestant ethos of salvation through self-denial toward a therapeutic ethos stressing self-realization in this world - an
ethos characterized by an almost obsessive concern with psychic and
physical health defined in sweeping terms."19
Even had legislators and appellate judges the inclination to make
dramatic pronouncements in favor of broadening access to divorce decrees - and there is no evidence to support this hypothesis - their
work-product appeared in much too public a forum to have avoided
tremendous controversy. While many voices in the inter-war period
26.

William L. O'Neill, Divorce as a Moral Issue: A Hundred Years of Contro-

versy, in "REMEMBER THE LADIES": NEW PERSPECTIVES ON WOMEN IN AMERICAN HISTORY

139 (Carol V. R. George ed., 1975).
27.
HERBERT CROLY, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LIFE 346 (reprint ed. 1965).
28:
Karl N. Llewellyn, in MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: CREDOS OF SIXTEEN
AMERICAN SCHOLARS 183, 185 (1941).
29.
T.J. Jackson Lears, From Salvation to Self-Realization: Advertising and the
Therapeutic Roots of the Consumer Culture, 1880-1930, in THE CULTURE OF CONSUMPTION: CRITICAL ESSAYS IN AMERICAN HISTORY, 1880-1980 3, 4 (Richard Wightman &

T.J. Jackson Lears, eds., 1983).
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praised the pioneers of expanded divorce, a good number of cultural
and religious leaders continued to condemn the rise in the rate of divorce. As the popular literature reflected, the public proved increasingly sympathetic to multitudinous cases of individual relief through
the divorce courts. However, it became difficult to disagree with society's elders that there was nothing beneficial about the booming divorce rate increase itself.
This cultural stand-off was matched by a legal draw, in which
appropriate divorces were granted but the statutory dam still blocked
the flood of open divorce. Nor did public opinion force the issue of
broad legal reform. The growing ease of divorcing, particularly for the
well-off and middle classes, militated against any movement for reform. Katherine Fullerton Gerould remarked on the "tendency among
civilized people, who live 'above the law,' to underrate the sensitiveness of the average man, whose weaknesses laws are designed to control. Did you ever know anyone who admitted that laws existed to
control him?"3 "
The Roman Catholic Bishop of Boston, Eric F. Mackenzie, would
make the same point a generation later:
[T]here are many citizens of highest calibre who profess to be
shocked and horrified by the statistical reports of divorce
throughout the nation, but yet have upheld and defended individual cases among their personal acquaintance[s] ....The
theoretical condemnation of divorce in general has not persuaded these citizens to any judgment against divorce in individual cases .3 '
This moral snobbishness, helps explain why no League of Wretchedly
Unhappy Spouses ever launched a lobbying campaign.3 2 Moreover, divorce statutes were "precise enough to satisfy the moral predilections
of the clergy," while divorce practice was "lax enough to satisfy the

most fickle spouse.3
When it became clear that divorces were flowing at the will of the
parties, the legislative response, as we shall see in the next section,

30.
Katherine Fullerton Gerould, Divorce, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 1923, at
460, 463.
31.
Eric F. MacKenzie, Spiritual Values and the Family in Court, 18 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 20, 21-22 (1953).
32.
Gerould, supra note 30, at 463.
33.
Henry H. Foster, Jr., Family Law in a Changing Society, in SOCIETY AND
THE LAW: NEW MEANINGS FOR AN OLD PROFESSION 227, 446 n.2 (F. James Davis, et al.
eds., 1962).
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produced reforms seeking to muscle back the mountain of divorce.3'
Appellate courts, by contrast, broadened the range of cruelty and developed the doctrine of mental cruelty as a viable divorce ground. The
courts' expansion of cruelty was effectively penned by Sigmund
Freud. 35 In an age which featured ubiquitous psychological determinants of behavior, the acknowledgment of cruelty's mental component
is unsurprising, and did not stem from any ostensible intention on the
part of appellate judges to widen the aperture of divorce. The Louisiana Supreme Court typified the movement to extend cruelty's domain, holding that
any unjustifiable conduct on the part of either husband or
wife which so grievously wounds the mental feelings of the
other, or such as in any other manner utterly destroys the legitimate ends and objects of matrimony, constitutes cruelty,
although no physical or personal violence may be inflicted or
36
threatened.
Minnesota's highest court succinctly embraced the current psychological discourse: "Mental anguish may more perniciously affect health
and life than bodily bruises."3'7
Unlike their appellate superiors, trial judges actually dwelled in
the lower emotional latitudes of the law. They daily confronted, not
the rarified doctrines of collusion and recrimination, but the human
agony of matrimonial disruption. While this division of labor between
lower and higher courts had always existed, never before had the assertive individualism and consumerism of a vastly increased number
of divorce litigants descended upon the courts. Several factors allowed
trial judges to join divorce litigants in creating a rival - and nearly
34. See infra text accompanying notes 114-279.
35.
On Freud's impact on the culture of the 1920s, see FREDERICK LEWIS
ALLEN, ONLY YESTERDAY 98-112 (1931); SARA EVANS, BORN FOR LIBERTY 175-96 (1989).
For a discussion of the impact of Freudian psychoanalysis on ways of thinking about divorce, see LYNNE CAROL HALEM, DIVORCE REFORM: CHANGING LEGAL AND SOCIAL
PERSPECrIVES 93-97 (1980).
36. Krauss v. Krauss, 111 So. 683, 685 (La. 1927).
37. Tschida v. Tschida, 212 N.W. 193, 194 (Minn. 1927). Rare indeed are the
features of American culture which have no antecedents. While the proliferation of Freudian ideas belongs to the period after World War I, Robert L. Griswold has presented evidence that a "less restrained" definition of cruelty began to emerge in appellate opinions
as early as the mid-nineteenth century. He identified a shift "from social and moral considerations to medical and psychological criteria," as well as an emphasis upon
"individual autonomy at the expense of social order ... " Robert L. Griswold, The Evolution of the Doctrine of Mental Cruelty in Victorian American Divorce, 1790-1900, 20 J.
SOC. HIST. 127, 127 (1986). See also ROBERT L. GRISWOLD, FAMILY AND DIVORCE IN
CALIFORNIA, 1850-1890: VICTORIAN ILLUSIONS AND EVERYDAY REALITIES (1982).
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untouchable - divorce system. If, as Joseph Walter Bingham
claimed, law's substance was found in the "cases in all their concreteness of causes and effects... ,"38 then divorce judges could be legal realists par excellence. Trial court rulings announced no public policy
findings or deviations. They simply pigeon-holed facts into legal boxes
to resolve one case at a time. Since nearly all divorces were uncontested, and the decrees unappealed, it was virtually impossible for
appellate courts to review the judgments granting divorce. A Philadelphia study (summarized in Table 2) illustrated the irrelevance of
appellate courts to the vast majority of divorcing couples.
s
Table 23

Numbers of Appeals from Philadelphia Divorce Proceedings
Year Granted

Divorces

Appeals to
Superior Court

Appeals to
Supreme Court

1938
1944
1948

1,713
2,933
3,866

9
8
7

0
0
0

Only the "exceptionally abnormal" divorce case ever obtained appellate resolution.4 ° In terms the Advertising Age would have understood, trial courts adopted a policy of responsiveness to their clients,
and the satisfied customers joined the trial judges in evading review
by their off-floor managers, the appellate courts.
C. The "Unholy Trinity" of Divorce Grounds
Adultery, which H.L. Menken quipped was "the application of
democracy to love,"' derived from the English ecclesiastical practice
'
of allowing a divorce "a mensa et thoro."42
This limited divorce separated the parties but left them in spousal limbo by forbidding them to
remarry during the lifetime of the other. Adultery was the earliest
38.
Joseph Walter Bingham, in MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAW supra note 28, at 7, 13.
39.
Note, The Administration of Divorce: A PhiladelphiaStudy, 101 U. PA. L.
REV. 1204, 1222 n.87 (1953).
40.
Otto Kahn-Freund, Observations on the Possible Cooperation of Teachers of
Law and Teachers of Social Science in Family Law, 9 J. LEGAL. EDUC. 76, 76 (1956).
41.
H.L. Mencken, Sententiae, in THE VINTAGE MENCKEN (1955), reprinted in
THE HARPER BOOK OF AMERICAN QUOTATIONS 373 (George Carruth & Eugene Ehrlich
eds., 1988).
42.
ALBERT C. JACOBS & JuLIus GOEBEL, JR., CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON
DOMESTIC RELATIONS 410 (4th ed. 1961).
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and most widespread divorce ground in America. It also constituted a
capital offense in several New England colonies, but for innocent
spouses it at least represented an improvement by allowing remarriage. Although very few philanderers were executed in colonial
America, the law served both as a deterrent and as an unmistakable
expression of society's cherishing the principle of sexual exclusivity
within marriage. 43 Second in the "unholy trinity" of major fault
grounds was desertion, which was seen as an abdication of one
spouse's life-long responsibility to the other. All the states imposed
minimum time periods, at least one year but usually longer, to ensure
that the spousal abandonment was complete. 4 The final category,
cruelty, also branded one spouse as a legal offender, for proof of cru-

elty was the domestic
relations analog to a criminal prosecution for
45

assault and battery.
Of the three grounds, only cruelty became the "dazzling success
story] of family law"'' because its plasticity allowed it rapidly to outpace adultery and desertion as the favored ground for divorce. 47 In the
1860s, cruelty accounted for only one-eighth of all decrees. By 1922, it
was the most popular ground, and reliance on cruelty continued to increase, as Table 3 indicates.

43.

RODERICK PHILLIPS, A HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN WESTERN SOCIETY 147-48

(1988). See also Walter Wadlington, Divorce Without Fault Without Perjury, 52 VA. L.
REV. 32, 36-37 (1966). Adultery constituted the only universal divorce ground in the
United States. Only South Carolina presents a partial exception to this rule, when it experimented with divorce for ten years beginning in 1868. But from 1878 until the restoration of fault grounds in 1949, the Palmetto State forbade divorce entirely. J.D. Sumner,
Jr., The South CarolinaDivorce Act of 1949, 3 S.C. L.Q. 253, 257-59 (1951).
44. On the requirements for desertion actions from the end of World War I until the end of World War II, see 1 WILLIAM T. NELSON, NELSON ON DIVORCE AND
ANNULMENT §§ 4.01 to 4.51 (James M. Henderson & Publisher's Staff eds., 2d ed. 1945).
45.

JACOBS & GOEBEL, supra note 42, at 428-37; RHEINSTEIN, supra note 24, at

101-05. The Iowa Code, for example, rendered cruelty sufficient to warrant divorce as
"such inhuman treatment as to endanger the life of his wife." IOWA CODE § 10475 (1939).
A husband could proffer similar grounds. IOWA CODE § 10477 (1939).
46.
Lawrence M. Friedman & Robert V. Percival, Who Sues for Divorce? From
Fault Through Fictionto Freedom,5 J. LEGAL STUD. 61, 79-80 (1976).
47. Id.
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Table 348

Percentage of Absolute Divorces and Annulments in the United
States by Divorce Ground
Year

Adultery

Desertion

Cruelty

1867-70

26.4

35.4

12.4

1916-20
1921-25
1926-30
1935
1940
1945
1950

12.1
10.7
8.4
6.9
6.2
5.6
2.7

36.9
33.3
29.9
26.1
25.1
20.0
17.6

27.8
35.2
39.9
44.4
47.8
54.6
58.7

Cruelty's share of all divorces rose from one-eighth in 1870 to
two-thirds in 1949.49 In Idaho, divorce plaintiffs succeeded on cruelty
grounds and forswore adultery petitions even more disproportionally
than the national rate. In 1948, almost eighty percent of all Idaho divorces were decreed on the ground of cruelty, while less than one-half
of one percent were officially attributed to adultery5 The utter malleability of this ground was noted in World's Work magazine in 1919
when it editorialized that cruelty "embraces almost anything from
violent and constant attacks upon the person, endangering life, to
'severity' of manners or deportment, or treatment involving the
'dignity' of husband or wife."5 1 The periodical concluded that cruelty
has simply come to mean that the "husband and wife do not like each
other and would be much happier if they could dissolve an unfortu52
nate partnership.
Support for a broad reading of the cruelty ground came from
many sources. Almon Hensley, former president of the New York
Mothers' Club, argued that "[c]onstant nagging is [a] better justifica-

48.
JACOBSON, supra note 15, at 121 tbl.58.
49.
Id.
50.
Id. at 123 tbl.59. The 1948 Idaho divorce ground statistics were as follows:
cruelty: 79.5%; desertion: 8.8%; neglect to provide: 5.9%; drunkenness: 1%; adultery:
0.4%; and all other grounds: 4.4%. Id.
51.
American Divorce Rate Still Increasing,38 WORLD'S WORK 247, 247 (1919).
52.
Id. On the popularity of the cruelty ground, see BABER, supra note 20, at
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tion for divorce . . . than misconduct.5 3 Doris Stevens believed that
cruelty grew out of incompatibility and included mental anguish." An
anonymous writer in Harper's noted that her husband did not physically mistreat her but merely forbade her to smoke and attempted to
censor her reading matter. 5 She was fairly confident that she could
obtain a divorce on grounds of cruelty." Time noted in 1937 that the
ground was so easy to prove that plaintiffs who would normally have
pleaded adultery were instead alleging "excessive cruelty" out of
squeamishness. 7 As University of Minnesota law professor William L.
Prosser acknowledged to readers of Forum, mental cruelty 'is an inevitable accompaniment of any marriage which has been a failure."'"
D. Double-Barreled Fault: The Role of Defenses
Divorce defenses also revealed the legal system's emphasis on
critical moral distinctions proven by specific acts. In fact, the legal defenses focused attention on the formal system's requirement of double-barreled fault: not only must the defendant be guilty, the complainant must be innocent.5 9 In the looking-glass morality of divorce
law, forgiveness was taboo. The resumption of sexual relations following knowledge of the existence of a fault ground was deemed to be
conclusive proof that the innocent spouse had "condoned" the guilty
spouse's misconduct. An act of forbearance was not evaluated in the
context of the whole of the marriage. Mercy constituted a devastating

53.
Are Changing Conventions Menacing the Marriage Institution?, 74
CURRENT OPINION 338, 339-40 (1923).
54.
Doris Stevens & Ruth Hale, The New Freedom in Divorce - Can it be Secured by Uniformity in MarriageLaws?: A Debate, 76 F. & CENTURY 321, 330 (1926).
55.
Who Gets the Children?,161 HARPER'S MONTHLY 455, 455-56 (1930).
56.
Id. at 456.
57.
Divorce Report, TIME, July 19, 1937, at 60, 61. Both the reluctance to establish a "hotel adultery" case and the ease of divorce alternatives are far older. For example,
there is evidence that Heinrich Schliemann, the archeologist who excavated Troy,
spurned his lawyer's offer to trump up a New York adultery charge and instead easily obtained a divorce in Indiana. Richard Jenkyns, But Is It True?, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Dec.
19, 1996, at 15, 16-17.
58.
William L. Presser, Divorce: The Reno Method, and Others, 100 FORUM 286,
289 (1938); See also Doris Stevens, Uniformity in Divorce, 76 FORUM 322 (1926); Who
Gets the Children?,supra note 55; Divorce Report, supra note 57. Also noting the ease of
establishing cruelty were John Gilland Brunini, States' Rights and Divorce, 20
COMMONWEAL 578 (1934); and the discussion by "Mr. Con" in Pro and Con: Legalize Divorce By Mutual Consent?, READER'S DIG., Jan. 1939, at 91.
59.
RHEINSTEIN, supra,note 24, at 53.
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faux pas, for a single act of intercourse would bar the innocent
spouse's access to the divorce court.6
Collusion and connivance reinforced the law's preoccupation with
adversarial divorce. Husbands and wives were forbidden to agree
upon a divorce ground. Collusion, a defense presumably raised sua
sponte by the court, would defeat a divorce action upon discovery that
the couple had cooperated in seeking to obtain it. 1 In fact, such a mutual desire was officially regarded as "morally reprehensible 6 2 and
"several degrees worse than murder.6 3 A few states went so far as to
create the office of "divorce proctor" or "defensor vinculi" (literally,
"defender of the [marital] bond'), charged with rooting out collusion in
divorce cases. Connivance, a variant of collusion, would deny a divorce
to a spouse who had "corruptly" agreed that his or her spouse could
6
commit a marital offense. 4
Anne Shannon Monroe argued in the pages of Good Housekeeping that the single-act theory of divorce law was psychologically
warped. 65 She insisted that the "very thing that will positively defeat
an attempt to obtain a divorce - the agreement of the two that it is
the wisest course - is the one absolute reason why a decree should be
granted."" Katherine Fullerton Gerould summarized the argument
against the bar of collusion:
[W]hy do your best to prevent people's divorcing when both of
them want to? The cry against divorce on the score that in
most divorces one person is sacrificed becomes absurd enough
60.
Id. at 53-54; see also Walker, supra note 24, at 194-95. As Judge Paul W.
Alexander observed, "[Ihf the plaintiff extends mercy to the defendant, the law punishes
him for it." Id. at 195 (quoting Alexander, The Follies of Divorce: A Theurapeutic Approach to the Problem, 36 A.BA J. 105, 168 (1950)). Condonation itself subsumed a bizarre twist, for its continued effectiveness as a bar was conditioned upon "conjugal kindness" by the offending spouse. Subsequent marital miscues, not themselves substantial
enough to be independent grounds for divorce, might be sufficient to allow the onceestopped condoner to revive the original divorce action. Wadlington, supra note 43, at 39.
61.
Walker, supra note 24, at 195.
62.
JOHN SIPJAMAKI, THE AMERICAN FAMILY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 181
(1953). Sociologist Ray E. Baber's quip that "if a marriage becomes intolerable to either
husband or wife, it may be dissolved; but if it becomes intolerable to both, the state rules
that in the interests of society it must be maintained!" overstated the formal law, but only
slightly. BABER, supra note 20, at 479.
63.
Louis HARRIS, LoVE, MARRIAGE, AND DIVORCE IN HISTORY AND LAw 99
(1930), quoted in ANDREW G. TRuxAL & FRANCIS E. MERRILL, THE FAMILY IN AMERICAN
CULTURE 679 (1947).
64.
VERNIER, supra note 16, § 62, at 8, § 80, at 92-95. See also RHENSTEIN, supra note 24, at 54-59; SIRJAMAKI, supra note 62, at 181.
65.
Anne Shannon Monroe, When Shall a Woman Divorce Her Husband?,
GOOD HOUSEKEEPING, Oct. 1921, at 74.
66.
Id. at 96.
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when you realize that only on the basis of one person's wanting it and the other person's not wanting it is a divorce obtainable at all. 7
As Judge Robert Grant concluded, collusion converted every divorce
ground into the catch-all moral ground of incompatibility."
Unrelentingly opposed to all marital dissolutions, Commonweal
argued that collusion flowed from divorce, and that proscribing collu6 9
sion was as pointless as forbidding bootlegging during Prohibition. It
was in the nature of divorce law 'Irresistibly" to broaden all exceptions: "If unfaithfulness or physical cruelty are causes, why not incompatibility? If incompatibility, why not boredom? What court can
say which causes less subjective suffering, or which should be denied
relief?" 0 Paradoxically, the iron logic deployed by this Catholic periodical would become the operating wisdom of the 'popular law of divorce in America, with unmitigated individualism destroying - as
Commonweal predicted - all barriers to "free" divorce. The blurring
of specific grounds with their psychological components lifted the lid
on the Pandora's box of divorce. Wives and husbands became convinced that no court had the right to evaluate how much conjugal suffering merited the redemption of divorce. No rules could govern subjectivity. And the trial courts began to agree.
Recrimination was the divorce defense which most peculiarly but most convincingly - demonstrated the formal system's priority on
penalizing malefactors. Recrimination represented legal theory's determination to deny divorce to wives and husbands who had violated
their marital vows. It provided the means by which a defending
spouse could "admit even the most repellent charges made in the
complaint and still prevent the plaintiff from securing a divorce."71 In
such a case of mutual fault, the court was bound to withhold its decree, thus visiting the parties with 'the Sartresque punishment of remaining together and hating it." 2
Like collusion, connivance, and condonation, recrimination had
its distant genesis in Roman property law. The legal charter of antiquity had been recast by twelfth century canonists so that 'the Church
67.
Gerould, supra note 30, at 463.
68.
Grant, Marriageand Divorce,supra note 9, at 196-97.
69.
Divorce by Collusion, 17 COMMONwEAL 340, 340 (1933). The article noted
that burgeoning divorce rates had altered the attitudes of couples contemplating marriage, making the wedding vows increasingly more provisional. Brides and grooms were
thus "potential partners to a collusive divorce at the very altar." Id.
70.
Id.
71.
Beamer, supra note 22, at 213.
72.
Wadlington, supra note 43, at 38-39. See also Paul Sayre, Divorce for the
Unworthy: Specific Grounds for Divorce, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 26, 28-29 (1953).
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might intervene in a divorce suit which, if successful, would have
turned a wife loose on a society in which unattached women had no
place.7 3 These origins suggested that recrimination focused more on
property issues than on divorce itself.1 4 The modern twist given this
doctrine served only to block the decree, and appeared to ignore any
financial consequences of divorce. Ironically, however, recrimination
generally was raised as an issue only when one party was dissatisfied
with the property arrangements. Litigated recrimination cases generally involved a spouse "forced to resort to the defense of recrimination
because he [or she] has failed to bargain successfully outside of
court." 5 In those cases, the parties wielded the cudgels of moral fault
in a combat over finances.76
Recrimination fared no better than collusion in the popular journals. As Ruth Hale phrased the conventional wisdom, 'That spiritual
perceptiveness which holds that a divorce must on no account be
granted if both persons... have been unfaithful to the marriage, instead of merely one, can hardly be respected as a source of law or precept."' 7 Although mocked by many, the formal legal system insisted on
the letter of its peculiar anti-windfall logic: since divorce could only be
awarded to an innocent husband or wife, a guilty spouse could not
benefit from the other's marriage-destroying misconduct. Recrimination thus banned divorce unless both barrels of the fault system were
loaded.7 8
E. What the Divorce Judges Said
As noted above, a trial judge handling divorce cases in the 1920s
and 1930s faced the dilemma of resolving the conflict between, on the
one hand, the instructions laid down by legislatures and appellate
courts, and, on the other, the pervasive, unending, quotidian pull of
divorce litigants. The formal system began with the proposition that,
subject to certain narrow exceptions, marriage was a permanent
commitment. But this premise was regularly and stoutly denied by
the consumer culture, which acted on the opposite assumption that
"unhappy unions" were disgraceful and should be dissolved in divorce.
Ludwig Lewisohn declared that marriage should be held to a basic
standard of contentment: 'To fall below that minimum is to cheat both
the self and society, both the present and posterity, to sacrifice honor
73.
74.
75.
349 (1943).
76.
77.
78.

Beamer, supra note 22, at 213.
Id. at 243, 253.
Note, Recrimination as a Defense in Divorce Actions, 28 IOWA L. REV. 341,
Beamer, supra note 22, at 242-43.
Stevens & Hale, supra note 54, at 338.
Seagle, supra note 2 (criticizing the doctrine of recrimination).
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to a fetish and vitality to decay.'" 9 Thus, the popular view reversed
the formal postulate and its exceptions, holding that the pursuit of
happiness mandated ready divorce, subject to prohibitions upon particular circumstances. As English preacher and feminist A. Maude
Royden declared the "real immorality" consisted of pretending that a
marriage was working when it had broken.'
Popular voices complained that the necessity of proving fault in
order to obtain freedom was indecent. Katherine Fullerton Gerould
believed incompatibility was "certainly as reasonable a ground as any"
and far better than the requirement of "mud-slinging."8' 1 In response
to the moral calumny religious conservatives launched at those disdainful of the immutability of the conjugal commitment, Gerould argued that a spouse who refuses divorce to a partner desiring it was
"beneath contempt. 8 2 Since society permitted easy marriage, it should
guarantee divorce on demand, for the two were linked. The Nation
agreed, calling for "decency in divorce."' These cultural heralds also
challenged the logic of the fault grounds themselves. Royden highlighted the inconsistency of maintaining marriage as indissoluble by
its nature, yet permitting dispensations for specific reasons.84 Adultery, for instance, offended the carnal side of marriage. But to grant
divorce only for adultery was to elevate the physical bond over the
whole relationship. 85 The legal system's pretense that grounds subsumed "causes" was fake, Royden insisted, and led to "legal fictions,"
peijury and collusin.86

79.
Ludwig Lewisohn, On Love in Marriage:New Morals for Old, 119 NATION
464, 465 (1924).
80. A. Maude Royden, What Is Marriage?,ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 1923, at
297, 305.
81.
Gerould, supra note 30, at 460-61, 465.
82. Id. at 466-67.
83.
Decency in Divorce, 127 NATION 214, 214 (1928). The Nation editorialized
that it was wrong to "insist that before a divorce is granted one party must violently attack the character of the other." Id. See also Stephen Ewing, The Mockery of American
Divorce, 157 HARPER'S MONTHLY 153 (1928).

84. Royden, supranote 80, at 299.
85.
Id. at 300-01.
86. Id. at 305. In 1924, Atlantic Monthly published a poignant story by a man
whose wife had ceased to love him, and desired a divorce to marry another. The author
wanted happiness for his wife, and so intended to accede to her wish. But to do so, the law
demanded that he "come into court and accuse openly, publicly, a friend of mine, my onetime wife, of a statutory crime." Burnham Hall, Shall I Divorce My Wife?, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Aug. 1924, at 155, 156. Nonetheless, he concluded, this distasteful act would
ultimately serve everyone's best interest. Id. at 160-62. The author made no mention of
the more common alternative, that she accuse him of a marital outrage. Anticipating
some skeptical readers, the editors appended a comment that the story was "absolutely
true." Id. at 155.
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What happened to these "legal fictions" in court? The evidence
shows that trial judges treated them as page-turning, case-disposing
best sellers. In three substantial articles in Good Housekeeping, Mabel
Potter Daggett reported on her 1925 nationwide survey of divorce
judges."7 Their confessions about their attitudes and rulings, together
with other commentary by bench and bar in the popular press, reveal
a law system completely at odds with both statute and case law. What
the judges said about divorce reflected the changing culture more
than the unchanging law. In the words of Salem, Oregon Judge John
McCourt, "[U]ntil a few years ago public sentiment deterred many a
woman from divorce. Now a changed public sentiment, together with
the economic emancipation of woman, accounts in large measure for
the heavy increase in the ratio of divorce to marriage."8 The formal
premises of divorce law were of no consequence to Judge S.S. Sherman of Montrose, California, who maintained that "[d]ivorce is not an
evil. It's the mending of a marriage mistake." 9 Nor was Kalispell,
Montana Judge C.W. Pomeroy respectful of the traditional legal policy
when he observed that "on the whole, there are not divorces
enough."
The judges tended to be older than most divorce litigants, but in
this generational clash, the senior culture yielded. To Judge Peter
Shields of Sacramento, California, the "theoretical ideal" of marriage
must give way before the muscular pressure of wives and husbands
seeking personal fulfillment:
87.
Mabel Potter Daggett, Make Over Marriage If You Would Cure Divorce:
That's What The Judges Say, GOOD HOUSEKEEPING, June 1925, at 56; Mabel Potter Daggett, What The Judges Say About Divorce, GOOD HOUSEKEEPING, May 1925, at 36; Mabel
Potter Daggett, What The Judges Told Us About Divorce, GOOD HOUSEKEEPING, Apr.
1925, at 28. Similar judicial commentary is also compiled in Vera L. Connolly, Every Man
For Himself-There Is Only One Reason ForDivorce, GOOD HOUSEKEEPING, Feb. 1928, at
18; see also Ewing, supra note 83.
88.
Daggett, What The Judges Say About Divorce, supra note 87, at 108.
89.
Id. at 106.
90.
Id. at 36. The overwhelming majority of the judicial commentary presented
in Dagget's nation-wide survey indicates that trial judges were rejecting the dictates of
their appellate superiors on the requirement of establishing actual marital fault, spurred
on by an avalanche of litigants. Historian Robert L. Griswold, on the contrary, has argued
for "great congruence between appellate court rulings and lower court conceptions of
marital cruelty." Griswold, Evolution of the Doctrine of Mental Cruelty, supra note 37, at
142 n.3. But beginning in the 1920s, the popular culture raced far beyond the cruelty
ground, and - with the complicity of the trial bench - established a working jurisprudence of mutual consent divorce, a legal outpost never reached by appellate courts. See,
e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAw 65 (1987). As we
shall see in the next section, even when presented with relatively clear legislative mandates to remove considerations of fault from divorce cases, appellate courts often found
ways to retain the jurisprudence with which they were most comfortable: ascertaining
culpability. See infra notes 141-278 and accompanying text.
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We of an earlier age may deplore divorce and regret that
youth does not have the fortitude to bear the sorrows of a mistaken marriage for duty's sake. But today the world supports
the married person who will not endure an existence in which
happiness is impossible or sacrifice the realities of life to a
theoretical ideal. 9'
Trial judges acknowledged divorce as a 'Tire-escape from a domestic hell,' 9 2 and believed "the moral atmosphere is better with divorce easy and rapid. 9 3 They supported women divorcing husbands
who refused to grant them equality in marriage, and they also viewed
woman's emancipation in economic terms, remarking that 'how much
a woman will forgive today is almost in inverse ratio to how far is the
factory.'* Judge John S. Dawson of Topeka, Kansas, took pride in his
state's elevation of women to a position of gender equality: 'The old
theory of dominion of the husband over 5the wife is, in Kansas, as dead
'
as Tut-ankh-amen. And I say Hurrah. 9
While the judges worried about the effect of divorce upon children, they voiced a cheer even for some parents seeking to break up a
family. Judge Grier M. Orr of St. Paul, Minnesota, opined that in a
home in which parents clashed openly and often, it was their duty to
divorce. 9' Similarly, Judge Hill believed that "no divorce can scar the
soul of a child more than that hell, a home devoid of all the bonds of
affection that sanctify marriage." 7 Ready divorce converted marriage
91.

Daggett, What the Judges Told Us, supra note 87, at 160. Judge Shield's

opinion about the support for dissatisfied spouses reflected the strength of litigants not
only in the United States, but also in Canada. Historian James G. Snell recounted the divorce paradigm north of the United States:
The customary rules of marriage and divorce coexisted with the formal divorce regime and interacted with the needs and position of individual couples
and spouses to produce a strikingly complex divorce environment. Always operating within the constraints of that environment, divorcing couples in early
twentieth-century Canada were able to turn the system back on itself, using
it to meet at least some of their own ends. Mutual consent was the most
prominent characteristic of a process in which couples took advantage of
loopholes in the formal divorce process, thus forcing the system to operate (to
some extent, at least) as the participants desired.
JAMES G. SNELL, IN THE SHADOW OF THE LAW: DIVORCE IN CANADA, 1900-1939, 191-92
(1991).
92.
Daggett, Make Over Marriage,supra note 87, at 184.
93.
Id. at 183.
94.
Daggett, What The Judges Say, supra note 87, at 108.
95.
Daggett, Make OverMarriage,supra note 87, at 178.
96.
Ewing, supra note 83, at 161.

97. Daggett, What The Judges Say, supra note 87, at 104. Judge Price of California agreed with Judge Hill that children sometimes suffer more within a ruptured
household. Daggett, Make Over Marriage,supra note 87, at 183.
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into trial marriage. Judge Chester F. Miller of Dayton, Washington,
focused on the evils of "hurried courtship" leaving young couples unprepared for conjugal rigors. When a "little hell on earth begins...
[d]ivorce is the best solution. ' 8 After the court-sanctioned marital
break-up, "[Tihe boy and girl who've had their lesson can each select a
second partner with greater care." Judge Ben B. Lindsey's oncecontroversial suggestion that a young couple experiment with marriage before settling down to the institution in a serious manner now
appeared more routine than radical. °° Physician and statistician I.M.
Rubinow observed that the popularity of Lindsey's "companionate
marriage" proposal "cannot be explained on the ground that he has
suggested a new way out. It is only evidence that society will always
vociferously approve something it is already practicing."0 1
As the trial judges saw it, the problem was not divorce, but marriage. The condition of matrimony had changed; divorce merely followed and obeyed the altered cultural norms. As Daggett summarized
their sentiments, "[D]ivorce is going to be worse until marriage is better."' 2 The consensus view was expressed by Judge W.A. Reynolds of
Chehalis, Washington. Laying to one side the teachings of appellate
courts and the pronouncements of the legislatures, he observed that
divorce in the 1920s was "an established, accepted exit from an un10 3
pleasant or irksome though not necessarily intolerable situation."

98.
Daggett, What The Judges Say, supranote 87, at 114.
99.
Id.
100.
See Is MarriageBreakingDown?, LITERARY DIG., Feb. 17, 1923, at 36.
101.
I.M. Rubinon, Marriage Rate Increasing Despite Divorces, 29 CURRENT
HIST. 289, 294 (1928). Judge Ben B. Lindsey was a popular subject of rabid commentary
in the periodicals, both pro and con. See Are Changing Conventions Menacing the Marriage Institution?. supra note 53; M.G.L. Black, A Business Woman on Companionate
Marriage, 148 OUTLOOK 286 (1928); Joseph Collins, The Doctor Looks at Companionate
Marriage, 147 OUTLOOK 492 (1927); Charlotte Perkins Gilman, Divorce and Birth Control, 148 OUTLOOK 130 (1928); Is MarriageBreaking Down?, supra note 100; Edward S.
Martin, Race Wars and Marriage, 155 HARPER'S MONTHLY 653 (1927); Fulton Oursler, A
Criticof CompanionateMarriage, 148 OUTLOOK 648 (1928).
102.
Daggett, What The Judges Say, supra note 87, at 121.
103.
Daggett, WIhat the Judges Told Us, supra note 87, at 166. On the question
of which institution was more problematic, Indiana Judge William A. Kittinger said the
"chief trouble... is not with divorce but with marriage." Daggett, What the Judges Say,
supranote 87, at 114. A bevy of judges agreed: Kansas' W.W. McComish, Wisconsin's R.A.
Richards, Oregon's F.W. Wilson, and Colorado's Samuel W. Johnson. Id. at 112-21. Other
judges in agreement were Oregon's George Tazwell and Indiana's Frank E. Hutchinson.
Daggett, Make Over Marriage,supra note 87, at 174.
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The cognitive dissonance between the court's duty to uphold- the
formal law and its intention nevertheless to accede to the demands of
the consumers of justice, was never far from the judicial consciousness, as a Muncie, Indiana judge disclosed to the Lynds: "A judge
never knows the inside reasons in divorce cases. A divorce case comes
up, and it's just another court case to be disposed of. I never look over
the records. The lawyers get all those details. You see, if the judge
0 4
knew these details,he might not grant the divorce.'
Accordingly, divorce judges treated cruelty as a blanket legal allegation covering up the truth of simple incompatibility or mutual
consent. What other conclusion could there be, after consideration of
the types of divorces granted on the ground of cruelty? Stephen Ewing
collected several examples of such awards in his 1928 report in
Harper's:1. to a husband, because the sound of his wife's voice injured
his delicate health; 2. to another husband, who claimed his spouse
was "disagreeable in words"; 3. to a wife on the ground that her mate
had been 'Intolerably cool" to her; 4. to another wife, whose husband
had told her to go to hell once too often; and 5. to a husband, whose
wife made him get up five or six times a night to look after her cat. 5
Helen and Robert Lynd reported in 1929 that "loss of affection
[during] marriage was not legally recognized as sufficient reason for
dissolving a marriage until recent years." 06 Since no changes in the
formal law system occurred in the 1920s, the Lynds' account of the
changing law must have reflected a mutual acknowledgment between
the court and the spouses that divorce would be granted upon request.
Such an interpretation is reinforced by two examples the Lynds provided. In 1924, a divorce was granted to a Muncie couple who reported to the court that they had "no affection for each other and [did]
not want to live together." 07 Another divorce was awarded a husband
who pleaded that his wife said she did not love him and did not want

Midwestern and Western judges seemed most comfortable with the changing divorce mores. Sociologist Paul H. Landis even suggested that many Easterners migrated
west to take advantage of liberalized divorce law. "More mobile" Westerners lacked an
"established integrated society" and were less bothered by the loss of the traditional
"institutional" family. Paul H. Landis, Divorce in Our Time, 105 FORUM 665, 866-67
(1946). Substantially higher divorce rates occurred in the West than in any other part of
the country during the period covered in this article. JACOBSON, supra note 15, at 100
tbl.48.
104.
ROBERT S. LYND & HELEN MERRELL LYND, MIDDLETOWN IN TRANSITION: A
STUDY IN CULTURAL CONFLICTS 161 (1937).
105.
Ewing, supra note 83, at 159.
106.
ROBERT S. LYND & HELEN MERRELL LYND, MIDDLETOWN: A STUDY IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN CULTURE 114 n.8 (1929).
107.
Id.
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to live with him."0 8 Further support for the proposition that cruelty
became the cover story for divorces on grounds of incompatibility or
mutual consent may be found in the overall divorce data the Lynds
provided. The divorce explosion in Muncie may be seen by contrasting
its 87% increase in population between 1890 and 1920 with the 622%
increase in the divorce rate, comparing the numbers for the years
1921-24 and 1889-92.10 9 During that same generation, the percentage
of Muncie divorces granted on the ground of desertion dropped from
29.6 to 14.9.1 ° Adultery had provided the divorce ground 23.7% of the
time in the earlier period, but it decided only 14.5% of 1920s divorces."' Cruelty, however, increased its percentage from 30.3 to 51.7
2
of all divorce cases.1
That Muncie divorces for cruelty rose from fewer than one-third
to more than one-half did not, of course, signify an epidemic of connubial beastliness in Indiana, as the Lynds recognized. They noted that
cruelty "may cover almost any variety of marital maladjustment, and
the increase in divorces on this charge probably indicates chiefly a
growing flexibility which allows divorces on other than specific
charges such as 'adultery' and 'abandonment.""'" Clearly, though, the
pose of cruelty described a dissembling tactic far more than a malicious heart. Roscoe Pound twitted the irrelevancy of statute to conduct when he asked his readers to "consider what any American
community would think of a man convicted of extreme physical cruelty to his wife if those words were taken seriously.""' 4 The contrast
between the old and new dispensations on marital dissolution was
aptly etched by an article in Good Housekeeping which noted that
nineteenth-century marriages were "generally indissoluble, not because divorce laws were more severe than today - the laws have
108.
Id. In his study of Canadian divorce during this same time period, James G.
Snell observed that the way in which unhappy couples seized "control of divorce.., was
reflected in their behaviour and their language. Couples frequently spoke as though a divorce was theirs to give rather than the state's." SNELL, supra note 91, at 194. Of course,
uncontested divorces did not always reflect a mutual decision to sever the matrimonial
bonds. The Jersey Journal noted in 1933 that some defendants lacked the funds to hire
counsel to rebut the divorce charge, while others declined to fight because they felt certain of an unfavorable verdict. Still other non-litigants objected to exposing intimate details to public scrutiny, while a final group may even have been unaware of the proceedings, since they were served with notice by publication and had not "read the right newspapers." ForEasierDivorce, LITERARY DIG., July 29, 1933, at 18, 18-19.
109.
LYND & LYND, A STUDY IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN CULTURE, supra note
106, at 121.
110.
Id. at 521 tbl.12.
111.
Id.
112.
Id.
113.
Id. at 122-23.
114.
Roscoe Pound, Foreword,A Symposium in the Law of Divorce, 28 IOwA L.
REv. 179, 184 (1943).
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scarcely changed - but because public opinion exercised silent but
more implacable pressure."" 5 In the inter-war period, the inexorable
force of public opinion remained a constant. But the direction had
shifted.
Far from behaving as a much-maligned ancient regime of oppressive divorce restrictions, the fault system operated as a moral charade. The trappings of the fault matrix served as the divorce emperor's transparent clothes, fooling no one but staying in place for
want of a cultural alternative. With the significant exceptions of
spousal support and the uncertainties about the children of divorce,
the fault system well served the aims of both dissolution-minded couples and user-friendly trial judges. Neither group complained of the
mutually-beneficial arrangement. Judge Paul W. Alexander well understood the paradox: "[T]he trouble with guilt as a criterion is ...
[that it] virtually assures mutual consent as a ground for divorce.""' 6
The pliant cruelty standard rarely closed the gates on any consensual
divorce, and speedy divorce procedures facilitated docket control, increasingly a concern of urban judges.
Because their modus vivendi worked so well, neither trial courts
nor divorce-seekers were likely candidates to push systemic reform.
The call for significant changes to the American way of divorcing
came, instead, from the legislatures. The new grounds of
'Incompatibility" and 'living apart" were the formal system's attempts
to reverse the burgeoning divorce rate. The next section describes
these alterations by focusing on the route of incompatibility in New
Mexico and living apart in North Carolina, two jurisdictions where
the reforms had full play. The ultimate failure of these legal gambits
illustrates the yawning gap between the formal and popular divorce
arenas.
III. LEGISLATIVE EXPERIMENTS IN NON-FAULT DIVORCE
In the mid-nineteenth century, several states had "omnibus"
clauses in their divorce statutes which were broad enough to encompass divorce on the non-fault ground that the parties were incompati-

115.
Gina Kaus, As Long As We Both Shall Live, GOOD HOUSEKEEPING, Sept.
1926, at 38, 199. V.F. Calverton contrasted the respectability of divorce in the 1930s
stating that as recently as just. before World War I, his mother would refer to divorced
women as "indecent and immoral creatures," to which his father - a man who read Karl
Marx at breakfast - would echo, "Ditto." Hornell Hart & V.F. Calverton, Morals in Marriage: A Debate, 97 F. & CENTURY 345, 349 (1937).
116.
See DUKE UNIVERSITY OF FAMILY LAW, PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE OF
FAMILY LAW 179 (John S. Bradway, ed., 1959).
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ble.117 While few of these omnibus clauses emerged into the twentieth
century, Washington's law survived until the close of the Progressive
Era. Washington permitted a divorce for any reason "deemed by the
court sufficient," with the proviso that the court "shall be satisfied
that the parties can no longer live together."" 8 Omnibus clauses were
panned by divorce conservatives. These laws had the potential "to reduce the marriage relation to a mere state of concubinage, at the
mercy of the parties and the courts."1 19 Although these umbrella
clauses disappeared from the legislative arena, they were later resurrected in strait-jacketed form as the incompatibility statutes.
Some states realized the divorce trade brought needed revenue,
and they did not need omnibus measures to attract a divorce clientele.
While Nevada is best known as the mecca for migratory divorceseekers, Idaho, South Dakota, Arkansas, and several other states
competed for the dissolution business. These states did not alter the
grounds of divorce, but merely shortened the period of residency required for filing a divorce action. In Idaho, for example, a mid-century
divorce suitor needed to reside in the state for only six weeks before
applying to the courts for relief. 20 Idaho's divorce rate in 1948 was 5.7
per thousand residents, nearly double the 2.9 per thousand national
21
average.
In these states, as throughout the nation beginning in the decade
after World War I, both trial judges and litigants understood that obtaining a divorce decree was a formality. But particularly for wealthy
Eastern would-be divorcees desirous of privacy or a vacation, a trip to
the West could provide both diversion and a divorce. 12 Despite the
media attention lavished on them, however, migratory divorces never
became more than a negligible fraction of all American divorces. Divorce statistician Paul Jacobson estimated that migratory divorces accounted for no more than three to five percent of the annual divorce
tally.1 23 Most unhappy spouses lacked either the money or the incen-
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PHILLJPS, supra note 43, at 454; Orfield, supra note 16, at 659. Orfield noted
that legislative divorces, which were unregulated, prevailed in the early national period
and were not entirely eliminated until the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Id. "We
are told," wrote Roscoe Pound, "that the legislature was appealed to in cases that were
too flimsy or too whimsical for the courts." Pound, supra note 114, at 187.
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tive to leave their home jurisdiction. 12 4 As we have seen, local divorce
courts were generally as welcoming as any commerce-driven court.
For want of current domestic models, some Americans in the
1920s looked to Scandinavia for guidance in crafting new divorce
laws. The Nordic model offered absolute divorce to a couple where
they had lived apart for three years and "deep and lasting" mutual
disagreements 2 ' had propelled them to a separation, based on the
1910 recommendation of a joint Norwegian-Danish-Swedish Commission.126 The Nation praised such laws for assuring the legal and economic equality of the sexes in divorce proceedings.1 27 Stephen Ewing
quoted the Danish Prime Minister's defense of his nation's law on the
grounds that it was "morally indefensible" to force two people to stay
together when "all the bonds" between them had severed.128 Nancy M.
Schoonmaker in Current History, Ruth Hale and Edwin Bjorkman in
the Forum, and Dorothy Dunbar Bromley in Harper'sMonthly advocated modeling domestic29divorce statutes on the models from Norway,
Sweden, and Denmark.
Stephen Ewing also described the Scandinavian divorce process.13 0 Couples seeking a dissolution were required to discuss their differences with either their minister or a designated government official.' 3 1 If they did not reconcile, they could receive a legal separation
upon agreeing on the custody of any children, as well as on financial
arrangements.1 32 After a separation of between twelve and eighteen
13
months, the couple could petition for an automatic decree of divorce.
If only one party wished to end the marriage, then the length of the
requisite separation period extended to between two and two-and-onehalf years.'34 Ewing concluded his summary for American readers by
observing that in Scandinavia, "[I]t never becomes necessary for husbands and wives to attack each other in order to gain their free-
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RILEY, supra note 24, at 136. On migratory divorces, see id. at 119, 130,
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125.
Ewing, supranote 83, at 155.
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dom."' I 5 One-half of American jurisdictions eventually developed a
home-spun version of Scandinavian living-apart laws, but required far
longer periods of separation. 136 While the stated purpose was to prevent brutalization in the divorce courts, the underlying goal of the
American statutes was to induce fractious couples to remain together
for five or ten more years. 137
A. Incompatibility on Appeal
Between 1920 and 1969, seven American jurisdictions adopted
statutes permitting divorce on the ground of incompatibility. The
Scandinavian influence can be directly seen in the first such law,
passed by the Virgin Islands. 38 For the residents of the former Danish
territory, the incompatibility statute merely carried over the substance of prior law, which since 1770, had granted divorces for
'Irremediable disharmony in the common life."' 39 In 1933, New Mexico
added incompatibility as a divorce ground, followed two years later by
the Territory of Alaska. 41 Oklahoma joined the list in 1953, followed
in the next decade by Nevada, Delaware, and Kansas."' Despite their
open-faced language, incompatibility statutes failed to trigger a
wholesale transformation of pseudo-cruelty jurisprudence. In the absence of evidence of legislative intention beyond the bare addition of
this new ground to the divorce statutes, appellate courts often refused
to countenance divorces merely upon couple's demonstration that they
could not live together. Rather, courts often insisted that a complainant continue to prove blamelessness in the breakdown of the marriage. This grafting of a threshold behavioral requirement demonstrated how difficult it was for the formal legal system to uproot itself
from the regime of fault.
Exploring the tortuous path of incompatibility on appeal affords
us a window into the ideological dimension of this branch of the for135. Id.
136. See infra Table 4.
137. See infra notes 209-24 and accompanying text.
138. Orfield, supra note 16, at 663 (citing VIGGO BENTZON, FAMILIERETTEN 155
(1924)). After the transfer of the Virgin Islands to American sovereignty in 1917, incompatibility of temper was one of the grounds recognized in the Code of Laws of the Municipality of St. Croix in 1920, and a similar code was enacted for St. Thomas and St. John
the following year. Each code contained the incompatibility provision in its Title III, ch.
44, § 7(8). The history of the Virgin Islands' non-fault statute is traced in Lester B. Orfield's Divorce for Tempermental Incompatibility. Orfield, supra note 16, at 662-62. See
also Burch v. Burch, 195 F.2d 799, 805-06 (3d Cir. 1952).
139.
Orfield, supra note 16, at 663 (quoting BENTZON, supra note 138, at 155).
140.
1933 N.M. Laws 54; 1935 Alaska Sess. Laws 54.
141.
1953 Okla. Sess. Laws 22; 1967 Nev. Stat. 278; 56 Del. Laws 296 (1968);
1969 Kan. Sess. Laws 286.
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mal legal system. Referring to the formal legal system, Friedman and
Percival have noted that the "study of law in this country is mainly
the study of appellate case law."1 42 Higher-court opinions, in the words
of legal historian Michael Grossberg, "offer the most thorough commentary on the law.'' 4 Historian Robert L. Griswold agreed, although
he conceded that the decisions of appellate tribunals "suggest an elegance and consistency to legal reasoning not evident at the local
level.' 4 4 These appellate opinions reveal a legal system remarkably
divided about the legitimacy of the popular culture of divorce. Even
when the legislative mandate provided an opportunity for bridging
the gap between the two cultures, many appellate judges declined the
invitation. The nineteenth-century view of divorce, insisting on a
bright line between the meritorious and the meretricious, lived on in
the ideology of many appellate courts long after the popular culture
ceased to pay it even lip service.
B. New Mexico: "Clean Hands" v. 'Trial Marriage"
New Mexico adopted the first modem fault-free divorce ground
with surprisingly scant notice. Throughout its history, New Mexico's
divorce jurisprudence had been thoroughly grounded in fault. In 1872,
its territorial courts were given authority to grant divorces in cases of
adultery, cruelty, and abandonment." 5 In 1887, the legislature provided for divorce in the event of habitual drunkenness or nonsupport
by a husband of his wife. 148 Three more grounds made their appearance in 1901: impotency, the wife's undisclosed pregnancy by another
at the time of the marriage, and imprisonment for a felony during the
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marriage.147 A generation later, in 1933, the state legislature made a
dramatic change in the formal law, by adding one word "incompatibility" - to the catalog of divorce grounds.' 48 There is no
legislative history on the passage of the bill, nor do the official Governor's Messages of the time period contain any mention of a proposed
change in the divorce law. To trace the winding and rewinding of formal divorcing in New Mexico, we must turn to four decades of appellate decisions.
The first attention paid to the new incompatibility statute by the
New Mexico Supreme Court came in an unusual 1935 case, which
never formally presented the issue at all. Twenty-four year old Margarita Medina De Chavez's marriage to Francisco Chavez, whose age
was given as between seventy and eighty, broke up in bitterness and
mutual accusation.' 41 Margarita sued her husband for desertion and
nonsupport. 150 Francisco, whom the trial court described as "decrepit
and in his dotage," claimed that Margarita had deserted him and was
living with Reuben Garcia.15 ' The trial judge answered the question of
who deserted whom in favor of Margarita.'5 2 Further, the divorce
judge believed that, since Margarita's adultery with Reuben had occurred after her separation from Francisco, her fault did not count as
a valid recriminatory defense for her aged husband. 5 3 Thus, Margarita was awarded both divorce and alimony.'5

147.
1901 N.M. Laws 62. Nineteenth-century antecedents to New Mexico's incompatibility statute are discussed in Orfield, supra note 16, at 659-60. The history of the
new approach in New Mexico is sketched in Wadlington, supra note 43. While the impotency ground is not based on fault, it frustrates the traditional procreative purposes of the
union. Non-disclosure of pregnancy and commission of a felony, while not conventional
fault grounds either, focus on behaviors which may harm the marriage. Interestingly,
section 23 of the 1901 Act provided that when couples had permanently separated, either
could request that a court divide their property, dispose of their children, or (in the-wife's
case only) award alimony. 1901 N.M. Laws 62. The statute apparently allowed the couple
to separate without judicial approval.
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147) pertaining to rights of separated couples to have the court decide child custody and
resolve financial arrangements. That the state's highest court had to speculate as to the
legislature's intent only a few years after the enactment of the new divorce law, suggests
the difficulty of ascertaining legislative motives.
149.
Chavez v. Chavez, 50 P.2d 264, 264-65 (N.M. 1935).
150.
Id. at 264.
151.
Id.
152.
Id.
153.
Id. at 264-65.
154.
Id. at 264.

IDAHO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34

On appeal, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that adulterers
can never have clean consciences. 155 Postponing the satisfaction of
immoral concupiscence until after separation, noted Justice A.L. Zinn
in the majority opinion, does not diminish the absolute sway of the recrimination doctrine." 6 Margarita should not gain a divorce because
57
"whoever appeals to a court for relief must do so with clean hands.'
The absence of statutory sanction or prior decisional law as to recrimination did not prevent the court from treating it as a concrete
pillar of the common law. The justices relied on a variety of cases from
around the country,'5 8 including an 1882 Michigan case, Hoff v.
Hoff, 59 in which the eminent Justice Thomas Benton Cooley pronounced:
A proper administration of justice does not require that courts
shall occupy their time and the time of people who are so unfortunate as to be witnesses to the misdoings of others in giving equitable relief to parties who have no equities .... Divorce laws are made to give relief to the innocent, not to the
guilty.

160

Accordingly, the majority in Chavez reversed the lower court and remanded for a new divorce trial.'
The incompatibility statute was examined in two concurring
opinions. Justice Andrew H. Hudspeth believed that alimony was at
the heart of the Chavez' dispute,'1 62 and he strongly disagreed with the
majority's revival of the recrimination doctrine. 63 Hudspeth noted the
"paradoxical and puzzling"' nature of recrimination, as well as the
state divorce statute's failure to mention it. 16' He suggested that, unless limits were set on recrimination, "incompatibility" would be a defense in an action brought on 'Incompatibility."' He went on to describe the new alternative to fault:
155. Id. at 265.
156. Id.
157.
Id.
158. Id. at 265-66.
159.
Hoff v. Hoff, 12 N.W. 160 (Mich. 1882).
160. Id. at 160. In Hoff, the trial court had awarded both husband and wife a divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty of each toward the other. The appellate court took
pains to remind the trial judge that the recrimination doctrine forbade this evenhandedness. Id.
161.
Chavez, 50 P.2d at 266 (Hudspeth, J., concurring specially).
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When the Legislature wrote this additional ground of divorce
into our law, they intended to afford a remedy for a spouse incompatible with his or her mate, and that too without regard
to the wishes of the other spouse, or the fact that the other
spouse might have a ground for divorce. It is a recognition of
167
the fact that in many cases both spouses are to blame ....

Similarly opposed to recrimination, Justice Howard L. Bickley
argued that divorces should be granted even when irreconcilable
spouses are both at fault.'" Refusing to set free such wives and husbands only led to the commission of more offenses against public morality."1 9 Bickley believed that the new incompatibility ground was a
legislative "declaration of policy that the district courts have full
power and authority to decree divorces from the bonds of matrimony
when the court is satisfied that the parties can no longer live to170
gether.

Formal affirmance of the ground of incompatibility waited until
1941. Robert C. Poteet and his wife Leera had been married for
twenty years prior to Robert's filing a divorce action based on the new
ground. 7 1 Leera disagreed with his claim of incompatibility, however,
characterizing the separation as owing to Robert's desertion. 7 2 She
saw no reason why they could not "live together harmoniously as husband and wife" if only Robert would "refrain from associating with
other women and be contented with his home life.17

3

Robert's plural-

ity of affections was not as key to the litigation, however, as was
Leera's ill health. After enduring several operations, she needed Robert's financial support. Either she believed she had a steadier expectation of income if she remained Robert's wife and could enforce his obligation to provide her necessities, or the estranged spouses had simply come to an impasse on the amount of alimony to be provided. The
trial court found that the spouses were incompatible, thus granting
Robert a divorce. 74 In the trial court's view, "If one party is unwilling
to continue the relation there isn't any power on earth - court, or
anywhere else - to make it a go."'7 5
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On appeal, the ailing wife insisted that a divorce should only be
awarded to the 'Injured" party."6 As Justice Bickley phrased the
wife's position for a unanimous supreme court, she "contend[ed] for a
very strict sociological view, and argue[d] that the attainment of divorce should be very difficult."'77 As the author of the.liberal concurrence in Chavez, Justice Bickley could not reasonably be expected to
espouse the wife's "very strict sociological view," whatever that meant.
On the contrary, Bickley opined that the incompatibility statute was
designed to remedy the flaws in the 1901 law governing legal separation.'78 Spouses who separated, but could not divorce, lived in a hazardous legal limbo where the temptation to establish extramarital
sexual liaisons loomed too closely for the average and otherwise lawabiding New Mexican. To prevent the public corruption of
"husbandless wives" and "wifeless husbands," the incompatibility
statute allowed permanent separations to mature into spousal freedom. "' In affirming the trial court's grant of a divorce, Justice Bickley
pointedly distinguished incompatibility from the unacceptable option
of divorce by mutual consent 80 Curiously, he rejected mutual consent
while simultaneously noting that it was an approved method for
ending inhospitable marriages among numerous peoples both past
and present. Mutual consent divorce had, in Justice Bickley's estimation, received approbation from such thinkers as More, Milton,
Selden, Lecky, Montesquieu, Bentham, and Mill, all of whom he listed
in his opinion. 8'
The jurisprudential pendulum achieved its highest liberal peak
in the 1946 decision which reversed Chavez and outlawed recrimination as a divorce defense. Several years after his twenty-year marriage had effectively ended with a separation,'82 Nick Pavletich sued
his wife for an incompatibility divorce.'83 Ellis Cacic Pavletich countered that Nick's adultery with Lucille Worrell should block his obtaining legal freedom." The true nature of the quarrel may be found
in the 336-page transcript of the divorce hearing, much of it relating
to disputes over property. 88 District Judge Albert R. Kool granted
Nick a divorce, rejecting the notion of recriminatory defenses because
they fostered only "an intolerable moral situation as long as those
176.
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parties live and are physically capable of the sexual act .... I think it
[recrimination] is a cruel and inhuman law."' s
Speaking through the author of the other Chavez concurrence,
Justice Hudspeth, a supreme court majority agreed with Judge Kool
that a spouse's adultery does not trump his or her own otherwise
valid divorce action. In a wide-ranging discussion, Hudspeth reviewed
the "slowly changing" views of recrimination around the world. 7 He
cited the idea of "divorce without fault" prevailing in lands as disparate as Sweden, Russia, and Germany.' He discussed various legal
authorities, including extended quotation from J.G. Beamer's influential essay, The Doctrine of Recrimination in Divorce Proceedings,
which concluded that this peculiar divorce defense violated human
experience and bred contempt for the law and the courts which administer it.' s9 But Chief Justice Daniel K Sadler launched a furious
dissenting volley at his Pavletich colleagues. Incensed that incompatibility "brings us to the very border, if not into the actual domain, of
trial marriage,""' Sadler argued for a retention of recrimination as a
way to set limits to incompatibility. He feared that the new ground, 'If
freely employed," would effectively eliminate all others except possibly incurable insanity as the basis for divorce. '1 Sadler stood fast
against the sanctioning of a divorce to a party who had triggered
conjugal incompatibility by committing "a capital sin of the marriage
1 92
relation.'
Recrimination's death had indeed been announced prematurely.
Four years after Pavletich, the departure of Justices Hudspeth and
Bickley from the supreme court bench allowed Justice Sadler to eviscerate its earlier holding and resurrect recrimination in New Mexico.' 93 Myrtle I. Clark had pleaded her husband's adultery in response
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degeneration into trial marriage were later expressed in Oklahoma, which had adopted
incompatibility in 1953. Burl Harris, Divorce: Incompatibility as Ground for, 7 OKLA. L.

REV. 99, 99-102 (1954).
193.
Clark v. Clark, 225 P.2d 147 (N.M. 1950).
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to his assertion of marital incompatibility."M She contended that Robert's insistence on "his pretended right to engage in extra-marital
adulteries ' was the sole cause of their incompatibility. The trial
court refused to hear evidence about Robert's infidelity, since Pavletich had rendered such testimony irrelevant.196 By a three-to-two
vote, the New Mexico Supreme Court remanded the case with instructions that the district court hear and evaluate the recriminatory evi-

dence.

97

The new Clark majority held that a divorce should be denied

if it "shocks the conscience" of a trial court to reward a blameworthy
plaintiff with undeserving freedom."9
Despite Justice Sadler's efforts, however, he could not destroy incompatibility. By the 1950s it became clear that the Clark limitation
was ineffectual in slowing down divorce.' Trial courts were no more
interested in the enforcement of recrimination than was the general
public. As legal scholar Robert Earl Lee suggested, recrimination is
"particularly pernicious because it arouses in the layman who learns
of it a profound contempt for the law. And of course in this instance
the layman is right.' *°° By 1952, as Justice Henry G. Coors noted, incompatibility had become New Mexico's most commonly used divorce
194. Id. at 148.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 149.
198. Id. Two Justices dissented on the Pavletich rationale: a finding of incompatibility should end the trial court's inquiry. Id. at 150. In the majority opinion, Justice
Sadler (no longer Chief Justice) revealed that he had fallen one vote short of completely
overruling Pavletich, and so had to settle for its severe restriction. Id. at 148-49. As one
commentator noted about incompatibility after Clark, "[Tihe concept of fault continues to
exist in New Mexico though in an attenuated fashion." Orfield, supra note 16, at 667.
199. Perhaps the problem was that in the vast majority of instances neither the
parties nor the divorce courts believed in recrimination. Most cases were uncontested,
and rare must have been the plaintiff sloppy enough to prove the case against his or her
own position. Moreover, other divorce courts shared New Mexico trial judge Albert R.
Kool's view that recrimination was "cruel and inhuman." In Wisconsin, the state "divorce
counsel" represented the official public interests in divorce suits. According to one report,
the "divorce counsel" had recommended denial of dissolution in over 100 suits on the basis of the recrimination doctrine. The Wisconsin trial courts had followed his recommendation in only one case. N.P. Feinsinger and Kimball Young, Recriminationand Related
Doctrines in the Wisconsin Law of Divorce as Administered in Dane County, 6 WIs. L.

REV. 195, 213 n.39 (1931). While the Idaho Supreme Court eschewed dramatic pronouncements on the excesses of recrimination, it commanded trial courts to use their
common sense in applying, or refusing to apply, what the court termed the equitable
"maxim" of recrimination. Howay v. Howay, 74 Idaho 492, 497, 264 P.2d 691, 694 (1953).
The Idaho Supreme Court also specifically forbade extending recrimination to cases
arising under the state's living-apart divorce law. Jolliffe v. Jolliffe, 76 Idaho 95, 100, 278
P.2d 200, 202 (1954).
200.

1 ROBERT EARL LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW

§

71, at 347 (4th ed.

1979) (quoting HOMER H. CLARK, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON DOMESTIc RELATIONS 704
(2d ed. 1974)).
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ground.2 01 After nearly two tortuous decades of development, incompatibility had finally shed the skin of fault. The Clark "shock-theconscience" test was not overruled, but no court ever applied it. In the
words of Justice Coors, all a plaintiff needed to demonstrate was "that
a state of incompatibility exists regardless of whether it is anyone's or
no one's fault."'1 No other relevant cases were decided in New Mexico
until 1973. In two cases that year, the supreme court examined the
history of incompatibility and recrimination 'Inthe light of present
social conditions."2 03 The court once again abolished the defense of recrimination in proceedings under the incompatibility statute, admitting the obvious in its understated confession that "[t]his Court has
not been entirely consistent in its views as to the validity and effectiveness of recrimination as a defense to divorce on the ground of incompatibility."204
The New Mexico experience with formal incompatibility confirms
Professor Wadlington's observation that, in most jurisdictions, 'the
ingrained concept of fault [was] difficult for the judiciary to overcome."205 Nor was Wadlington alone; years before New Mexico's highest tribunal finally phrased its mea culpa about its deviating standards, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had
remarked that New Mexico courts "have had difficulty in dealing with
[incompatibility], even in the formulation of its definition and especially in deciding what recognition should be accorded to the defense

201.
Bassett v. Bassett, 250 P.2d 487, 495 (N.M. 1952); see also Hines v. Hines,
328 P.2d 944 (N.M. 1958). The statistics bore him out. In 1948, for example, nearly seveneighths of New Mexico divorce decrees were premised on incompatibility. This rate
dwarfs the percentages for desertion (7.6%), neglect to provide (1.9%), cruelty (0.8%), and
drunkenness (0.4%). Incredibly, not one adultery divorce was recorded in New Mexico in
1948. JACOBSON, supra note 15, at 123 tbl.59, 126.
202.
Bassett, 250 P.2d at 495.
203.
Garner v. Garner, 512 P.2d 84, 86 (N.M. 1973). See also New Mexico ex rel.
DuBois v. Ryan, 514 P.2d 851, 853 (N.M. 1973). Although recrimination was not formally
annulled until the Garnerdecision, the victorious appellee in that case actually requested
that the New Mexico Supreme Court penalize her ex-spouse for filing a "frivolous appeal"
suggesting the viability of recrimination. The court declined the invitation. Garner, 512
P.2d at 87.
204.
DuBois, 514 P.2d at 853.
205.
Wadiington, supra note 43, at 52.

IDAHO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34

of recrimination. 0 6 Nor was New Mexico alone in grappling uncertainly with formal no-fault. In Oklahoma, evidence suggests that the
practicing divorce bar, weary of the hypocrisy of manipulating the
cruelty ground, convinced the legislature to pass an incompatibility
statute in 1953.207 Three years later, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
rendered its interpretation of 'incompatibility."2 8 In a marvel of logical exegesis, the court concluded (in Professor Wadlington's delicious
paraphrase): "[T]hat spouse X might be compatible with spouse Y
even though Y was incompatible with X, and.., under these circumstances no divorce should be granted. ' 0 9
Incompatibility was not the only option the formal legal system
pursued to manage the divorce explosion; indeed, its adoption by the
late 1960s by only six states and the Virgin Islands rendered this experiment rather limited. Another formal reform of the legal system,
far more extensively applied, was the living-apart statute. The following section explores the range of this non-fault alternative, and
concludes that living-apart laws were terrific failures because they
ignored the demands of the popular culture.
C. The World of the Living-Apart Statutes
Many states took a different, time-oriented, approach to nonfault alternatives. In these jurisdictions "living-apart" statutes recognized marital breakdown as a ground for divorce so long as it was evidenced by the parties' separation for a specified time. As the following
section will show, on first blush, since proof of the requisite separation
was all that these statutes appeared to require, they appeared to provide a demonstrably simpler threshold than the incompatibility laws.
In fact, however, some appellate courts again improvised a demand
for an innocent plaintiff onto these statutes. More significantly, al206.
Shearer v. Shearer, 356 F.2d 391, 399-400 (3d Cir. 1965) (Freedman, J., dissenting). In her otherwise scathing attack in Our Scandalous Divorce Laws, Dorothy
Dunbar Bromley had kind words for New Mexico's legal experiment. Apparently unaware
of incompatibility's rocky road on appeal, Bromley lauded the statute unstintingly: 'The
only state where a self-respecting man or woman can come into court and terminate a
marriage without at least offering proof of prolonged separation is New Mexico. This state
admits as a ground for divorce plain incompatibility, in reality the most common cause for
divorce, marriage counsellors will tell you." Dorothy Dunbar Bromley, Our Scandalous
Divorce Laws, 66 AM. MERCURY 272, 275 (1948).
207.
Bliss Kelly, Preventing Divorces: Oklahoma City's Family Clinic, 45 A.B.A.
J. 566, 566 (1959); 1953 Okla. Sess. Laws 22.
208.
Chappell v. Chappell, 298 P.2d 768, 771 (Okla. 1956).
209.
Wadlington, supra note 43, at 47. In a symposium on the Law of Domestic
Relations in Oklahoma, Richard T. Sonberg criticized the Oklahoma court in terms
nearly identical to the Third Circuit's comments about New Mexico. Richard T. Sonberg,
Grounds for Divorce in Oklahoma, 14 OKLA. L. REV. 395, 403 (1961).
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though legislatures continued to reduce the waiting periods which
triggered applicability of these non-fault laws, divorce-minded wives
and husbands avoided them in droves. Litigants vastly preferred to
role-play their parts on the soothing stage of a courtroom bound by
the thoroughly corrupted but user-friendly rules of fault.
Seen from overhead, the tactical maneuvering between state
legislatures and divorce clients resembled a "B" movie chase scene.
The legislature would pass a living-apart statute with a lengthy
waiting period. When few or no divorcees availed themselves of the
statute, the legislature would shorten the time period. By then, the
divorce-minded were even more determined not to be stalled in their
quest for ready divorce. The legislature would try again, but never
until quite recent times able to find its quarry. Twenty-three American jurisdictions enacted living-apart statutes prior to California NoFault in 1969. While the first such statute was passed in Wisconsin in
1850, only two other nineteenth-century state legislatures enacted
similar legislation. The bulk of living-apart statutes date from the period beginning at the end of the Progressive Era.
These laws constituted a major theoretical inroad into the dominant fault milieu of family law. They allowed the parties to decide for
themselves when a marital relationship had terminated, requiring
only proof that a specified time period had elapsed in order to assure
themselves and society that the rift was irremediable. Because the
court proceedings were limited to technical issues of jurisdiction,
venue, and proof of separation, the parties were spared the intrusion
into their privacy which fault divorce proceedings mandated. The following table contains the living-apart statutes enacted in twentythree jurisdictions prior to California No-Fault, along with the period
of separation required prior to the divorce filing:
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Table 4
Living-Apart Divorce Statutes Enacted Prior to 1971
Alabama
1915 Ala. Acts 413
1933 Ala. Acts 153
Arizona
1931 Ariz. Sess. Laws 12
Arkansas
1937 Ark. Acts 167
Delaware
51 Del. Laws 27 (1957)
56 Del. Laws 296 (1968)
Districtof Columbia
49 Stat. 539 (1935)
79 Stat. 889 (1965)
Hawaii
1967 Haw. Sess. Laws 76
1970 Haw. Sess. Laws 116
Idaho
1945 Idaho Sess. Laws 125
Kentucky
1850 Ky. Acts 498
Louisiana
1916 La. Acts 269
1932 La. Acts 31
1938 La. Acts 430
Maryland
1937 Md. Laws 396
1947 Md. Laws 240
1961 Md. Laws 104

5 years21 0
2 years
5 years
3 years
3 years
18 months
5 years
1 year
3 years
2 years
5 years
5 years
7 years
4 years
2 years
5 years
3 years
18 months

Alabama's unique living-apart statute allowed relief to a wife who had been
210.
separated from her husband for five years, and had not received support from him during
that time. 1915 Ala. Acts 415. In 1919, (1919 Ala. Acts 631) the period without support
was reduced to two years, and it remained at two years when the legislature lowered the
separation period to two years in 1933. 1933 Ala. Acts 153. Despite the element of nonsupport, the Alabama Supreme Court decided that the divorce provision did not require
proof of marital fault but merely reflected the fait accompli of a broken marriage. Barrington v. Barrington, 89 So. 512, 513 (Ala. 1921). In 1948, the court reaffirmed the nonfault character of the law by upholding a divorce awarded to a woman who bore a child
from an adulterous relationship. Gardner v. Gardner, 34 So. 2d 157, 159-60 (Ala. 1948).
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Nevada
1931 Nev. Stat. 111
1939 Nev. Stat. 23
1967 Nev. Stat. 278
New York
1966 N.Y. Laws 254
North Carolina
1907 N.C. Sess. Laws 89
1921 N.C. Sess. Laws 63
1933 N.C. Sess. Laws 163
1965 N.C. Sess. Laws 636
Puerto Rico
1933 P.R. Laws 46
1942 P.R. Laws 62
Rhode Island
1893 R.I. Acts & Resolves 1187
South Carolina
1969 S.C. Acts 170
Texas
1925 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4629 (West)
1953 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 91 (West)
1967 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 288 (West)
Vermont
1941 Vt. Acts & Resolves 43
Virginia
1960 Va. Acts ch. 108
1964 Va. Acts ch.363
Washington
1917 Wash. Laws 106
1921 Wash. Laws 109
1965 Wash. Laws 15
West Virginia
1969 W. Va. Acts 49
Wisconsin
1866 Wis. Laws 37
Wyoming
1939 Wyo. Sess. Laws 106

5 years
3 years
1 year
2 years
10 years
5 years
2 years
1 year
7 years
3 years
10 years
3 years 211
10 years
7 years
3 years
3 years
3 years
2 years
8 years
5 years
2 years
2 years
5 years
2 years

211.
In order to enact its living-apart statute in 1969, South Carolina voters first
amended the state constitution. 1969 S.C. Acts 77 (noting amendment of 1895 Constitution, article XVII, section 3).
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Ostensibly, the theory behind living-apart statutes held simply
that dead marriages deserved a formal burial. In 1929, the Supreme
Court of Rhode Island articulated the rationale for these laws: "Any
injury to the state from the dissolution of the family cannot now be
cured by insisting on the continuance of a semblance of a marriage
when the substance has long since disappeared. 12 The Idaho Supreme Court later elaborated on the philosophical basis for these
laws:
The proposition is universally accepted that the state has a
paramount interest in marriage and divorce. The family unit,
constituting as it does the very base of our religious, cultural
and moral life, is one of the principal supporting pillars of our
civilization. The state created by the people for the protection
and promotion of their common welfare, must protect and foster marriage and the family relationship. However, the state
is not the author of man. It cannot alter basic biological or
other characteristics endowed by a higher authority. Any attempt to do so, or to ignore or suppress the fundamentals of
human nature, dooms the regulation to failure and defeats its
purpose. The result is often a train of unanticipated evils more
grievous than those sought to be corrected. When the marriage relationship has completely and finally broken down and
the relations of the parties have reached an impasse where
reconciliation is impossible and the family unit has ceased to
exist, no rule or regulation promulgated by authority of the
state can restore it. The object of the state's protection has
ceased to exist. Whether the fault be of one only or of both the
parties, the result is the same. From that point on the best interest of society is served by a recognition of the ultimate fact
the individuals involved
and its consequences, not only1 upon
3
but upon the community itself.
But the living-apart statutes did not authorize divorce upon marital
breakdown. The catch to the laws is reflected in the "long since disappeared" language of the Rhode Island decision. A statute which required a multi-year separation prior to filing guaranteed that the departed ghost of the marriage would never return; it also assured that
the statute would seldom be utilized.
Early twentieth-century legislators were in a bind. They knew, as
both trial judges and the popular press repeatedly broadcast, that
212.
213.

Dever v. Dever, 146 A. 478, 479 (R.I. 1929).
Howay v. Howay, 74 Idaho 492, 501, 264 P.2d 691, 697 (1953).
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mutual consent was the operating principle in American divorce
court. They were also troubled by the divorce rate, rising steadily in
the teeth of restrictive and unchanging laws. Many state legislators
endorsed what sociologist Ray E. Baber termed a "half solution" to the
problem. 21 They crafted statutes which would, on the surface, appeal
to divorce-bound wives and husbands, particularly those more
squeamish and less willing to engage in testimonial exaggeration or
outright peijury. These laws would not require one spouse to malign
the character of the other. Instead, they would appeal to marriage
partners who had mutually agreed to terminate 21the
association and
5
sought to do so fairly and without needless blame.
A non-fault basis, the removal of the need for vicious accusation,
and the appeal of an "honest" divorce procedure: these were the carrots in the living-apart statutes, which Baber also called "slow motion
'divorce by mutual consent.' '2 1 6 There was only one stick, but it was a
large one. In order to obtain these benefits, a couple would have to
separate and then wait for five or eight or ten years. Despite their
popularity with the legislatures, non-fault alternatives prior to 1970
never succeeded in capturing a significant market share of divorces.
Appellate judges were at times skeptical about disentangling livingapart statutes from the umbrella of fault and sporadically ruled that
the party seeking the divorce not be culpable in causing the separation.
But by far the major reason for the failure of the non-fault alternatives was that the divorcing public largely ignored them. The unappetizing waiting periods discouraged all but a very few. As William
Seagle exclaimed in the American Mercury, Washington's law permitting no-fault divorce after eight years of separation was a wonderful

214.
BABER, supra note 20, at 518.
215.
See SIRJAMAKI, supra note 62, at 184. By positing mutual consent as the operating paradigm of American divorce, I do not mean to suggest that all decisions by divorcing couples were free and voluntary. Undoubtedly, many individuals merely acquiesced in a divorce decision made by their spouses, a capitulation reflecting either a power
imbalance within the relationship or a felt helplessness in the face of legal process. My
review of the literature, both popular and formal, suggests only that those who mutually
gave free consent greatly outnumbered those who grudgingly did so and that the cultural
tone of the former group dominated the public discourse.
216.
BABER, supra note 20, at 518.
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idea, "but eight years is a long time in a world where life is short.2 17
During the entire period under study, Rhode Island had a provision in
effect which allowed the trial court, in its discretion, to award a divorce to parties separated for ten years.2"8 The state supreme court's
approval of this technical deviation from fault did not trigger a rush
upon the courthouse; nor could it have been so intended. 19 In fact,
even states which repeatedly sliced their waiting period found little
increase in takers. North Carolina's first living-apart statute, passed
in 1907, required a ten-year separation. In 1921, the legislature
halved that time period. Twelve years later the living-apart phase
was reduced to two years. Finally, in 1965, only a one-year separation
was required. In Washington, the period of anticipation fell from eight
years in 1917 to five years in 1921 to two years in 1965. In Maryland,
the statutory procedure took five years in 1937, three years in 1947,
and eighteen months in 1961.220 No matter what the numerical prestidigitation, so long as the state's divorce code included cruelty as a
divorce ground, none of these non-fault statutes were widely used.
Why not?
Statutes providing for living-apart divorce were not aimed at facilitating divorce. On the contrary, they were efforts to stall the divorce traffic. Legislatures provided this kinder, gentler alternative to
fault divorce in the hope that division-minded couples would wait out
the statutory separation period, rather than hurtling pell-mell into
court on a fraudulent ticket of fault. When vastly'increasing numbers
chose to enlarge the scope of fraud and perjury in order to obtain
"quickie" fault divorces, the legislatures lowered the bait of the livingapart statutes. But no manner of conservative reform sufficed to curb
the rush. Although a handful of long-dead marriages were formally
buried under these statutes, it strains human reason to believe that
217.
Seagle, supra note 2, at 41. The great length of most living-apart statutes
was also criticized. Bromley, supra note 206, at 273-77. Generally, however, the popular
press ignored living-apart laws, as did the divorcing population. In 1948, only three percent of all American divorces were obtained under the living-apart statutes, although
such laws were in effect in 17 states and the District of Columbia. Estimates for individual states vary. In North Carolina, which did not allow divorce on the ground of cruelty,
91% of all divorces were on the separation ground. This legal cause was also relatively
popular in Louisiana (63%), the District of Columbia (24%), Vermont (20%), and Nevada
(14%). In the remaining living-apart states, less than one-tenth of marital dissolutions
were so premised. JACOBSON, supra note 15, at 123.
218.
1893 R.I. Acts & Resolves 1187.
219.
See Dever, 146 A. at 479. Rhode Island took its ten-year provision literally
to require a decade of sane contemplation by both parties upon the fate of their relationship. The state supreme court denied a divorce in a case in which the couple had lived
apart for 10 years, but the wife had been insane for the final two-and-one-half years.
Camire v. Camire, 113 A. 748 (R.I. 1921).
220.
See supra Table 4.
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many couples desiring a divorce would plan on waiting for the bell to
toll the eighth, or fifth, or even the third year of separation.22 ' As we
have seen, given the fact that eighty to ninety percent of all divorces
were uncontested, few couples chose to wait. The cases which dot the
state appellate reports illustrate no-consent divorce, where generally
the stumbling block resulting in litigation was the lack of an accord on
property and future financial issues. Reported divorce cases were always unrepresentative of the general patterns of American divorcing.
We now turn to the North Carolina experiment in living apart.
Because North Carolina did not allow divorce on many of the usual
grounds, such as cruelty, desertion, drunkenness, or neglect to provide, its living-apart statutes took on increased importance for divorce-minded couples. For example, Paul H. Jacobson's statistical
monograph listed adultery as the divorce ground in only seven percent of North Carolina divorces in 1948, while ninety-one percent of
the divorces were based on the separation statute.222 North Carolina
was the Reno of living apart. Of the 13,300 divorce decrees issued nationwide in 1948 on separation grounds, nearly 6,000 were obtained
in North Carolina.222 The statistics displayed in Table 5 confirm the
overwhelming popularity (if only by necessity) of the living-apart provisions in later years.

221.
One marvelous Arizona case, however, assayed a twist on the planningahead theme. A husband successfully divorced his spouse on grounds of having lived
apart for the requisite five years. The wife then filed a 60-page complaint seeking to overturn the divorce, one of the grounds being that her husband had bribed the Arizona Legislature to enact the living-apart statute in order to effect his divorce. The Arizona Supreme Court rejected the wife's suit and affirmed the propriety of the living-apart law.
Schuster v. Schuster, 73 P.2d 1345 (Ariz. 1937).
222.
JACOBSON, supra note 15, at 123, 125.
223.
Id.
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Table 5
Absolute Divorces in North Carolina, by Ground, 1958-1969224
Year

Number

1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969

5,261
6,271
5,990
6,355
6,768
7,227
7,107
11,069
11,320
11,909
12,385
12,795

Ground
Adultery
Living-Apart
5,039
6,032
5,788
6,142
6,540
6,974
6,889
10,896
11,268
11,864
12,339
12,761

198
219
184
204
213
229
209
161
47
42
40
31

D. Living Apart in North Carolina
Irene and John Cook were married on March 22, 1900. But their
wedded bliss ended by August of that year. 215 A lengthy separation
began, to be punctuated in the following decade by two extensive lawsuits in different counties, each reaching ultimate resolution in North
Carolina's Supreme Court.226 During the course of the litigation, Irene
persuaded a Wake County jury to convict John for abandonment in
her action for limited divorce, and John sued Irene for absolute di227
vorce in Alamance County.

224.
LEE, supra note 200, 220-21 tbl.1 & 1A. Effective July 1, 1965, the period of
required separation was reduced from two years to one. 1965 N.C. Seas. Laws 636.
225.
Cook v. Cook, 74 S.E. 639, 640 (N.C. 1912) [hereinafter Cook /].
226.
Cook I, 74 S.E. at 639; Cook v. Cook, 80 S.E. 178 (N.C. 1913) [hereinafter

Cook II].
227.
Cook I, 74 S.E. at 640; Cook 11, 80 S.E. at 178. Limited divorce, also known
as divorce "a mensa et thoro," granted the parties a judicial separation but left them legally married. As a form of relief, limited divorce appealed to wives who wished to obtain
a support order but not a final divorce. By contrast, absolute divorce, or divorce "a vinculo
matrimonii,"constituted a total severing of the bonds of matrimony. See generally HOMER
H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 11.1, at 280-85
(1968); JOHN D. GREGORY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW 208-09 (1993).
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John Cook premised his suit upon the 1907 statute providing for
divorce upon a ten-year separation. 228 Irene contended that John's suit
was barred because the earlier Wake County verdict had conclusively
found him guilty of a marital offense, which thus prevented him from
229
attaining the status of the innocent plaintiff in his divorce action.
Key to Irene's position was her argument that a living-apart action
must be based on mutual consent. 2 ° However, the formal legal system
was still rigidly opposed to mutual consent. On the issue of recrimination, the supreme court narrowly ruled against her.231 Speaking for
the three-to-two majority, Justice William A. Hoke found nothing in
the statute 'to indicate that the right conferred is dependent on the
blame which may attach to the one party or the other ....1232 John's
abandonment of Irene five months after their
wedding was simply ir2 33
relevant to the action for absolute divorce.
Justice Hoke regarded the statute's public policy basis to be the
"assumption that it is not well for persons in these circumstances to
be absolutely deprived of all right to marry again ....,134 A ten-year
separation was evidence enough that the spouses were beyond reconciliation.2 35 In a concurring opinion pointedly directed at the two dissenters, Justice George H. Brown reiterated Justice Hoke's reasoning
in sepulchral and more pungent language, claiming it impossible to
imagine legislative intent
that the married life of the parties should be opened up and
the dead skeleton of an unhappy past be resurrected and displayed in all its nakedness to the public gaze. Cui bono?...
Why dig up from their graves the buried memories of broken
228.
Cook 11, 80 S.E. at 178. Passage of the first living-apart statute in the twentieth century had been far from assured. In the state senate, the measure succeeded by
one vote, 23-22. 1907 N.C. Sen. J. 183 (Jan. 31, 1907).
229.
Cook 11, 80 S.E. at 180.
230.
Id. at 179. In addition to the ten-year separation provision, the living-apart
law further required that both husband and wife have resided in North Carolina for 10
successive years and that no children have been born to the marriage. 1907 N.C. Sess.
Laws 89. In 1913, the latter two requirements were somewhat softened. Thereafter, only
the plaintiff need show a 10-year residence and divorce could be obtained as long as no
children were still living. 1913 N.C. Sess. Laws 165. No statutory provision required mutual consent.
231.
Cook 11, 80 S.E. at 180.
232.
Id. at 179.
233.
Id. Justice Hoke's position on recrimination is surprising, for in a concurring opinion in Ellett v. Ellett, 72 S.E. 861, 862 (N.C. 1911), Hoke insisted that a marital
wrongdoer should be estopped from prosecuting a divorce action. Hoke maintained that
"[tihe doctrine and the principle upon which [recrimination] rests lie deeper, and, in my
opinion, should now and always prevail." Id. Now and always did not last two years.
234.
Cook 11, 80 S.E. at 180.
235.
Id.
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lives? It is better to let the dead past bury its dead and not
disturb the remains. Such was evidently the wise and humane
23
purpose of the Legislature. 6
Dissenting Justice Platt D. Walker matched Justice Brown's fervor, if not his weakness for necrological metaphors. Walker maintained that the living-apart statute should be read in the context of
the overall divorce law, which permitted the awarding of divorces only
to 'the party injured. 13 7 By such placement, the legislature intended
that the living-apart statute "work no wrong or oppression to the
faithful and blameless spouse.113 Irene had steadfastly kept her marital vows, while John had "unlawfully, unjustly,. and cruelly abandoned" her, and had thus forsaken his entitlement to the prescribed
divorce procedure.2 39 Walker concluded as a divorce Cassandra with
long-range forecasting, warning that the court's holding will serve as
a "precedent for any evil-minded husband to desert or abandon his
wife for the very purpose of benefiting by the statute after ten years of
4
his wrongful separation.1'2 0
Within six years of Cook II, Justice Hoke's interpretation of the
241
living-apart statute had been interred, and recrimination exhumed.
The litigation between Robert and Susan Sanderson was factually
similar to the Cook II imbroglio.24 2 Could Robert be found guilty of
cruelty toward Susan and nevertheless obtain a divorce after ten
years? The answer from Cook II would be yes, but Justice William R.
Allen, a Cook If dissenter, convinced his colleagues that a recent legislative revision of the statutory code should reverse the result. The
reenactment of the divorce law by the legislature contained no change
at all. However, Justice Allen asserted that, in its recent readoption of
the divorce law framework, with both a "party injured" preamble and
the living-apart statute, the legislature had signaled a desire to reverse Cook II and condition the applicability of the living-apart law to

236.
Id. (Brown, J., concurring).
237.
Id. at 181 (Walker, J., dissenting).
238.
Id.
239.
Id. at 182.
240.
Id. Justice Walker's notion that a wave of malevolent husbands endowed
with a capacity for extremely long-range planning was bent on desecrating married North
Carolina womanhood was not the only striking conclusion he reached. He also opined
that the legislature lacked the power to order the courts to award divorces to any but the
injured spouse. Id. at 181.
241.
Sanderson v. Sanderson, 100 S.E. 590 (N.C. 1919).

242.

Id.
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blameless petitioners.2 43 That this revisionist legerdemain was a subterfuge for overturning Cook II was made clear in Allen's stronglyworded conclusion, which echoed Justice Walker's earlier dissent: "[I]t
would be a harsh and cruel rule to ... permit a husband to drive a
loving faithful wife from his home and refuse to permit her to return
for ten years, and then reward his conduct by granting him a divorce.
"244

The preeminent importance of financial obligation was apparent
in the next attempt to interpret the living-apart statute. After fourteen years of marriage, A.R. and Saphrony Ann Lee separated in 1910
245
when Saphrony was committed to a state hospital for the insane.
Chief Justice Walter Clark defined the injured party as the spouse
"wronged by the action of the other," and declared that the separation
contemplated by the living-apart law had to commence by mutual
consent.146 Unfortunately for A.R., his wife's insanity prevented him
from clearing either of these judge-made hurdles. 247 The Chief Justice
issue: Saphrony "is still entitled to support
concluded with the money
' 4
from her husband. 2 1
Another case involved Fay and W.J. Sitterson, married in 1913.249
By 1915, W.J. had been convicted of murder and sentenced to twenty
years in prison. 2" Although he had been pardoned in 1925, Fay had
not seen or heard from him for ten years at the time she filed her action for divorce on the ground of living apart.251 Her personal blamelessness was, however, insufficient to overcome the new jurisprudential obstacles the supreme court had devised in the quest for theoretical empire-building. The court denied Fay her divorce because her
marital separation had been involuntary, as she could not show that
Id. at 590-91. The "Consolidated Statutes" were adopted by 1919 N.C. Sess.
243.
Laws 238 (effective Aug. 1, 1919). Sanderson was handed down on October 22, 1919. Id.
at 390. The court did not discuss the fact that the lawsuit must have been filed and tried
prior to the effective date of the revision.
244.
Sanderson, 100 S.E. at 591. It should not be surprising that, as in Cook II
and Sanderson,the wife insisted upon the right to be the injured party. It was only as the
injured spouse that she could obtain alimony. See Carnes v. Carnes, 169 S.E. 222 (N.C.
1933). Equally unsurprising, given his turnabout on recrimination between Ellett and
Cook II, was the fact that Justice Hoke failed to dissent in Sanderson, although it completely undid his opinion in Cook I. Sanderson, 100 S.E. at 590.
245.
Lee v. Lee, 108 S.E. 352, 352 (N.C. 1921). North Carolina did not allow insanity as a separate divorce ground. Id. at 353. Although the Lees had apparently been
separated for 10 years, the waiting period was reduced to five years shortly before the Lee
opinion was handed down. 1921 N.C. Sess. Laws 63.
246.
Lee, 108 S.E. at 352.
247.
Id. at 352-53.
248.
Id. at 353.
249.
Sitterson v. Sitterson, 131 S.E. 641, 642 (N.C. 1926).
250.
Id. at 641.
251.
Id. at 642.
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her husband had committed murder in order to effect the conjugal
2 52
separation.
Justice Walker's doubts that the North Carolina legislature could
remove the requirement that a divorce plaintiff be the "party injured"
were put to the test in 1931.253 The legislature passed a new statute
allowing for a divorce "on application of either party," after five years
of separation, so long as no children had been born to the marriage,
and the plaintiff had resided in the state for five years. 25 4 The supreme court had hinted in 1933 that the new "either party" statute
had removed the "iinjured party" requirement. 255 The issue was
squarely presented the following year, when a trial judge, a disciple of
Justice Walker, declared the "either party" statute unconstitutional
'Insofar as it gives the person who commits the wrong the right to
take advantage of his own wrong."2 On appeal, the supreme court
calmly reversed the trial court, stoically observing that "[tihe statute
2 57
gives and the statute takes away.
But the surprising serenity of the supreme court lasted precisely
two years. In three cases decided in 1936, the court, now comprised
entirely by devotees of Justice Walker, decided that the "either party"
statute required a voluntary separation by mutual consent. A husband could not abandon his wife and then shield his immorality be28
hind the facade of the "either party" language. 1

252.
Id. at 643. Sitterson is quite unusual as a reported case which was most
likely uncontested. No counsel appeared for the husband at the appellate level, and, given
the facts, it is almost certain that W.J. never made an appearance himself. Nevertheless,
both the trial judge and the supreme court denied Fay relief. In response to the dilemma
posed by cases like Fay Sitterson's, the legislature soon amended the law to permit a living-apart divorce in the case of "an involuntary separation... in consequence of a criminal act committed by the defendant prior to such divorce proceeding." 1929 N.C. Sess.
Laws 6.
253.
See Cook 11, 80 S.E. at 181 (Walker, J., dissenting).
254.
1931 N.C. Sess. Laws 72.
255.
Reeves v. Reeves, 167 S.E. 129, 129-30 (N.C. 1933).
256.
Long v. Long, 175 S.E. 85, 85 (N.C. 1934).
257. Id. at 86. See also Campbell v. Campbell, 176 S.E. 250 (N.C. 1934).
258. Hyder v. Hyder, 187 S.E. 798 (N.C. 1936) [hereinafter Hyder I]; Reynolds v.
Reynolds, 187 S.E. 768, 769 (N.C. 1936); Parker v. Parker, 186 S.E. 346, 347 (N.C. 1936).
Hyder I illustrated the consequences of the supreme court's latest rotation around the
wheel of recrimination. Mary Hyder tried to block Govan Hyder's divorce by alleging that
the separation was due to his desertion. Id. at 798. The trial court, adhering to what was
then guiding - if evanescent - precedent, refused to allow testimony about her allegation, as it was irrelevant under the "either party" statute. Id. at 799. In Hyder I, the supreme court remanded the case for the judge to allow the jury to hear the whole case. Id.
at 800. The jury did, and found that Govan had indeed deserted Mary, thus disallowing
his right to a divorce. Govan's appeal was unavailing. See Hyder v. Hyder, 1 S.E.2d 540
(N.C. 1939) [hereinafter Hyder I1].
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The apogee of recrimination was reached in 1938, when the supreme court closed the courthouse door to a husband who had the temerity to seek a divorce after he had been convicted and imprisoned
for abandonment, nonsupport (of his wife and two children), and contempt of court. 2 "9 The court rewarded his chutzpa with a jeremiad
about the "unlawful and wrongful conduct [of the husband]" 260 rendering shameful
his seeking "to procure an advantage" through the
26
divorce court. '
The court's high dudgeon extended to the legislature, whose neutral language had misled some into believing "either party" meant
what it said. After a rhetorical sop to the legislature's supremacy over
the judiciary in matters of public policy, the court asserted its hegemony over interpretation: "[Ilt will not be assumed that any statute enacted by the Legislature was intended to override or depart from principles of public policy founded on good morals unless the language26of2
the statute clearly and unequivocally indicates such an intent."
Moreover, whenever the legislature reenacted a law or used the same
terms in a new statute, the court will presume that the legislature 'In
passing the later law knew what the judicial construction was which
had been given to the words of the prior enactment."26 Justice A.A.F.
Seawell later summarized the North Carolina judiciary's view of the
proper relationship between these not-so-equal branches of government: 'The history of divorce on the ground of separation discloses a
number of statutes on the subject, interlaced with judicial interpretation and respectful legislative response.24
During World War II, the supreme court flip-flopped on livingapart divorce in a brace of cases whose facts cast the "Villain" in an
extremely favorable light. Temporarily thrown off-balance by their
human sympathies, the justices changed their minds about the statute's reach, only to reverse themselves again a year later upon subsequent litigation in the same appeal. 20 In 1940, C.M. Byers told his
wife Sara Sherman Byers that he would not live with her any longer
because of her drug and alcohol abuse. 26 C.M. left the family home, in
the words of the supreme court, 'In a condition to afford ample com6 7
fort and protection to [Sara] and the children."2
Although the couple
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

Brown v. Brown, 196 S.E. 333, 334 (N.C. 1938).
Id. at 336.
Id. at 334.
Id. at 335.
Id.
Byers v. Byers, 22 S.E.2d 902, 905 (N.C. 1942) [hereinafter Byers 1].

265.

Id. at 903-04; see also Byers v. Byers, 25 S.E.2d 466 (N.C. 1943) [hereinafter

Byers II].

266.
267.

Byers 1, 22 S.E.2d at 903-04.
Id. at 903.
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did not enter into an agreement on spousal and child support, Sara
received from her husband "unlimited credit... at the grocery store,
the meat market, the oil fuel dealer, the dairy products dealer, the
druggist, the doctors, the dentists, the laundry, the dry cleaner, the
jeweler, the florist, and all other dealers in the necessities and comforts of life in the City of Charlotte... .'6 At C.M.'s suggestion, Sara
went to two different hospitals for treatment as an alcoholic and drug
addict.269 During the six months while she was hospitalized, C.M.
lived in the home to take care of the children, moving out again upon
Sara's return home.27° C.M. also paid her hospital bill of nearly
$1,400.271

In deciding this case, the supreme court faced a dilemma of its
own making. Prior case law set out a requirement of mutual consent,
which was not here met, despite C.M.'s exemplary conduct. 7 2 But the
court noted that, in the most recent reenactment of the living-apart
statute, the legislature had changed the phrase "separation of husband and wife" to "[the husband and wife] have lived separate and
apart. 2 7 3 Seizing on this minuscule alteration of the formulary, the
court divined legislative intent to discard the judicial gloss on the
word "separation" by the omission of that precise term in the new
statute.274 Because the mutual consent requirement was part of the
rhetorical baggage shipped with "separation," it could now be jettisoned in favor of the new terminology, which the court found
of a factual situation less amenable to interpretive
"descriptive
2 75
changes.
What about C.M., whose divorce had been denied by the trial
court for want of mutual consent in the separation? The solicitous justices ordered him a new trial, remarking that while a husband may
not obtain an advantage based on wrongful behavior, he clearly "is not
' 76
compelled to live with his wife if he provides her adequate support. 2
However, the new trial proved disastrous for C.M. The jury found that
he had failed to provide adequate support for Sara and the children,
268. Id. at 905-06. Sara and the children obtained the benefits of the arrangement, spending a monthly average of nearly $470 between 1940 and 1942. Id. at 904.
269. Id. at 904.
270. Id.
Id.
271.
Id. at 905.
272.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 906.
Id. The laws in question were 1931 N.C. Sess. Laws 72, 1933 N.C. Sess.
275.
Laws 163, and 1937 N.C. Sess. Laws 100. Id. at 905-06.
Id. at 906 (quoting Hyder 11, 1 S.E.2d at 541). For a discussion of Byers I
276.
which comes to a somewhat different conclusion from that argued here, see Lawrence T.
Hammond, Jr., Domestic Relations-Divorce-SeparationBy Mutual Consent, 40 N.C. L.

REV. 808, 808-11 (1962).
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and that he had offered "such indignities to [her] person... as to render her condition intolerable."2 7 In round two in the supreme court,
Sara became the victim and C.M. the villain. "One in flagrante delicto," thundered Chief Justice Walter P. Stacy, 'Isnot permitted to
recover in the courts.2' 78 C.M. should have known better, the Chief
Justice insisted: "One who plants a domestic
thornbush or thistle need
' 79
not expect to gather grapes or figs from it. 2
The remaining North Carolina history may be quickly told. Although described by a commentator as "a rare combination of silliness, futility and brutality,"28 the recrimination defense continued to
receive the blessing of the supreme court for decades. In 1978, the
legislature finally ended the charade by amending the divorce statutes specifically to abolish recrimination in living-apart divorce
cases. 28 ' As with the New Mexico history, the reforms crafted by North
Carolina legislators were subject to the erratic reading of state appellate courts unable or unwilling to shake loose the tar-baby of fault.
The formal legal system thus traveled uncertainly down the road from
fault to non-fault. In the popular arena, on the other hand, the reforms were largely bypassed. A Maryland study, for example, found
that the 6,430 absolute divorces issued in 1945 included 4,733 on the
ground of desertion, but only 319 on the living-apart law.28 2 The reason was simple: the separation statute required a five-year wait, desertion only eighteen months. Maryland did not allow divorces for
cruelty, so divorce filings gravitated into the desertion column. In the
author's understated conclusion, "plaintiffs are tending to shift the
83
grounds alleged in order to use the more liberal ...ones."2

277.
Byers II, 25 S.E.2d at 467.
278.
Id. at 469.
279.
Id. at 470.
280.
LEE, supra note 200, § 71, at 374(quoting CLARK, supra note 200, at 704).
281.
Id. at § 71, at 87 (Supp. 1989). That the supreme court remained an unyielding bulwark of the viability of recrimination may be seen by its full-court defense of
the embattled doctrine over the remaining decades. See Harrington v. Harrington, 210
S.E.2d 190 (N.C. 1974); Eubanks v. Eubanks, 159 S.E.2d 562 (N.C. 1968); O'rien v.
O'Brien, 146 S.E.2d 500 (N.C. 1966); Richardson v. Richardson, 127 S.E.2d 525 (N.C.
1962); Pruett v. Pruett, 100 S.E.2d 296 (N.C. 1957); Johnson v. Johnson, 75 S.E.2d 109
(N.C. 1953). The Harrington decision overturned a court of appeals opinion which had
held that adultery should no longer be available as a defense to separation. See Harrington v. Harrington, 206 S.E.2d 742 (N.C. Ct. App. 1974). This reversal goaded the legislature to intervene in an unmistakable way, with the "clear intention.., to nullify the future effectiveness" of the supreme court's Harringtonruling. LEE, supra note 200, § 71, at
346.
282.
CARL N. EVERSTINE, MARYLAND LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, DIVORCE IN
MARYLAND 17 (1946).
283.
Id. at 19.
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IV. CONCLUSION
These intramural matches between appellate courts and legislatures may have been a sideshow to the bulk of divorcing Americans,
but they set the tone for further formal revisions of the divorce process.2" Today, the prevailing winds have changed again, and the uncoupling of divorce and fault finally engineered a generation ago is
2
now being reconsidered in the popular press 8 and the legislative
286
chamber. The quest for divorce options to fault has now become the
search for alternatives to no-fault.
What became of the incompatibility laws and the living-apart
statutes? Incompatibility was arguably subsumed by its rhetorical
cousin, 'Irreconcilable differences," the talismanic phrase for marital
dissolution adopted by the California Legislature in 1969 in crafting
the nations first modern no-fault divorce law. 28 7 The culture of America in the 1970s no longer allowed for fault notions to adhere to any
divorce reform, and so the 'irreconcilable differences" statutes have
been virtually fault-free. The living-apart statutes have continued, in
a substantial minority of states, to moderate the separation period
which must precede a divorce filing. These pre-divorce waiting periods
can be quite brief. In Virginia, for instance, the spouses must have
maintained separate domiciles for one year.28 And if they have no
minor children and have concluded a separation and property settlement agreement, they need separate only six months before filing for
divorce. 28 9 As with the 'Irreconcilable differences" statutes, courts now
interpret living-apart laws entirely apart from the fault matrix of the
older divorce jurisprudence.2 90
But perhaps the modern fault-free statutes have succeeded too
well. No-fault reified in statute and practice the direction toward
which American culture had been only idly drifting in other aspects of
life: a predilection for formal and radical autonomy. The enshrine284.

On the history of American divorce reform, see J. HERBIE DIFONZO,

BENEATH THE FAULT LINE: THE POPULAR AND LEGAL CULTURE OF DIVORCE IN TWENTIETHCENTURY AMERICA (1997).

285. See, e.g., Dirk Johnson, Attacking No-Fault Notion, Conservatives Try to
Put Blame Back in Divorce, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1996, at Al; Jennifer Loven, No-Fault
Divorce Law Coming Under Legislative Siege, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1996, at A3; Barbara
Vobejda, Critics Seeking Change, Fault o-Fault' Divorce Laws for High Rates, WASH.
POST, Mar. 7, 1996, at A3.
See infra text accompanying notes 300-16.
286.
1969 Cal. Stat. 4500-508.
287.
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91(9)(a) (Michie 1995).
288.
289. Id.
290.
On this faultless interpretation of the Virginia living-apart statute, see Crittenden v. Crittenden, 168 S.E.2d 115 (Va. 1969).
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ment of divorce on demand intensified the development of what Milton C. Regan, Jr. has aptly termed the "acontextual self," a creature
"who stands apart from any social relationship in which he or she is
involved."2' l The marital relationship has exhibited no immunity from
this legal virus. The "happiness principle embedded in the no-fault
ground has dealt a devastating blow to the durability of marriages."2 2
law has fostered
And the dethronement of mutual consent in divorce
293
the loss of mutuality throughout American society.
This result should not be surprising. "[L]aw ... is more than a

barometer of social change," historian Norma Basch has noted. 294 It
"has an autonomy of its own and is capable of asserting its influence
over legislators, jurists, and the public."2 95 Divorce on demand is now
excoriated for "effectively disenfranchis[ing] the party who has not
initiated the termination."2 The 1990s have seen a growing legislative effort to turn back the divorce clock. In the most widely-discussed
bid, Michigan State Representative Jessie F. Dalman introduced 29
an7
eleven-bill package designed to establish a two-tier divorce system.
Couples without minor children could obtain a divorce upon consent.29 ' But in families with minor children, or where one spouse objected to the dissolution, the party seeking a divorce would have to
prove marital fault of the other.2 99 The reinvigorated fault grounds,
quite familiar to students of history, featured the unholy trinity of
adultery, desertion, and extreme cruelty, which would have to be established by a "preponderance of the evidence."00 Similarly, in his
1996 Condition of the State address, Iowa Governor Terry Branstad
attacked no-fault for "transform[ing] marriage into an arrangement of
convenience rather than an act of commitment."'0 Branstad called for
291.
MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY AND LAW AND THE PuRsurr OF INTIMACY 2
(1993). See also Bruce C. Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy in Family Law: The Wan-

ing of Belonging, 1991 BYU L. REV. 1 (1991); Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourseand the
TransformationofAmerican Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803 (1985).
292.
Annamay T. Sheppard, Women, Families& Equality: Was Divorce Reform a
Mistake?, 12 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 143, 146 (1990).
293.
Lynn D. Wardle has even argued that no-fault has fostered an increase in
physical violence in connection with divorce litigation. See Lynn D. Wardle, Divorce Vwlence and the No-FaultDivorce Culture, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 741 (1994).
294.
NORMA BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND
PROPERTY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY NEW YORK 229 (1982).

295.
296.

Id.
Richard Ingleby, MatrimonialBreakdown and the Legal Process: The Limi-

tations of No-FaultDivorce, 11 LAW & POLVY REv. 1, 14 (1989).
297.
H.R. 4432, 88th Leg., 1st Sess. (Mich. 1995).

298.
299.
300.

Id.
Id.
Id.

301.

Governor Branstad's speech was reprinted as Iowa "Vibrant and Growing"
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no-fault divorce to be replaced by laws which require a divorce court
to find mutual consent or marital fault.3 0 2 The Indiana Family Institute has proposed the Justice in Family Law Act, which would limit
divorce to mutual consent or fault grounds. 30 3 Micah A. Clark, the institute's associate director, attacked the excesses of Indiana's
'Irretrievable breakdown" standard, under whose banner a "whole
generation of Hoosiers has placed its marital future in a law that favors the unfaithful, the uncommitted, the selfish and the immature."3'04
Professor Elizabeth S. Scott has advanced "precommitment" restrictions, by which a couple could set out in an antenuptual agreement the conditions under which their marriage could be dissolved.3 5
These options might range from a legally enforceable commitment "til
death do us part" to milder obstacles to divorce, such as conditioning a
decree on economic penalties or mandating a delay prior to the award
of any divorce.30 6 Under Scott's rationale, a couple could decide that
only marital fault - as they defined it - would render their marriage
amenable to divorce proceedings. Bills introduced in the state houses
in Illinois, 3 7 Washington, 3 8 and Indiana,311 in 1995-96 proposed
Scott's "covenant marriage" option for couples who desired to enter
into connubial relationships impervious to no-fault divorce. These
bills aimed, in the words of the Illinois measure, at differentiating between two types of state-sanctioned unions, a "marriage of commitment" and a "marriage of compatibility. ' 10 Termed the "Marriage
Contract Act," the Illinois bill would allow couples to enter into binding contracts providing that marriage not be dissolved except by mutual consent or upon a showing by a preponderance of the evidence by
31 1
one party of the fault of the other.
In 1997, Louisiana enacted a "covenant marriage" law, 12 which
created an entirely new class of marriage. The new law precludes
couples who have chosen "covenant marriages" from access to the
302. Id.
303.
Micah . Clark, The Negative Effects of Easy Divorce, INDIANAPOLIS STAR,
Mar. 12, 1996, at AS.
304. Id.
305.

Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About Marriageand Divorce,

76 VA. L. REV. 9, 43-44, 79-91 (1990).
306. Id.
307.
H.R. 2095, 89th Leg., 1st Sess. (Ill. 1995).
308.
S. 5532, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. (Wa. 1995).
309.
S. 398, 109th Leg., 2d Sess. (Ind. 1996).
310.
H.R. 2095, 89th Leg., 1st Sess. (i11. 1995). Indiana State Representative
Dennis Kruse discussed his bill providing a "covenant marriage" option in Dennis Kruse,
Covenant Vows, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Mar. 12, 1996, at A5.
311.
H.R. 2095, 89th Leg., 1st Sess. (Ill. 1995).
312.
H.R. 756, 1997 Leg., 1st Sess. (La. 1997).
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state's liberal living-apart divorce ground, which allows for the
granting of divorce after only a six-month separation. 3 ' A "covenant
marriage" is defined as one between "one male and one female who
understand and agree that the marriage between them is a lifelong
relationship."'" The law mandates counseling for parties seeking to
choose the marital option, and seeks to reestablish the fault basis of
divorce jurisprudence: "Only when there has been a complete and total breach of the marital covenant commitment may the nonbreaching party seek a declaration that the marriage is no longer legally recognized." ' Despite this legislative intimation that a covenant
marriage would only be dissolvable under fault grounds, the statute
allows covenant marriages to be ended not only for several species of
connubial fault," ' but also if the spouses have lived separate and un17
reconciled for two years.3
Another divorce reform option would require mutual consent before granting a divorce, a step intended to force spouses to consider
more deeply the costs of divorce to their families. 31 8 One legislative
proposal embodying this widespread notion was introduced in Idaho
in 1996. 311 Idaho House Bill 470 proposed that the divorce ground of
irreconcilable differences be evidenced by "mutual consent of the parties to be substantial reasons for not continuing the marriage and
which make it appear that the marriage should be dissolved.3 20 This
bill to eliminate unilateral divorce was intended by its sponsor, State
Representative Tom Dorr, as an effort to reverse the hedonism of nofault divorce, which he characterized as a way for spouses to "cash in
their 40-year-old for two 2 0s and a Corvette."3' 1 Another Idaho proposal would have required the courts to stay the 'irreconcilable differences" divorce proceeding for one year if either party requested a stay
or if the couple had minor children. 322 Additionally, the bill included

313.
314.
315.
316.
Reg.Sess.).
317.

LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 103 (West, WESTLAW through 1997 Reg. Sess.).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:272 (West, WESTLAW through 1997 Reg. Sess.).
Id.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:307(A)(1) - (4) (West, WESTLAW through 1997
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9.307(A)(5) (West, WESTLAW through 1997 Reg.

Sess.).
318.

See ALLEN M. PARKMAN, NO-FAULT DIVORCE: WHAT WENT WRONG? xii-iv,

7-8, 137-40 (1992). Martin Zelder argued for a similar limitation in Ineffective Dissolutions as a Consequence of Public Goods: The Case of No-Fault Divorce, 22 J. LEGAL STUD.
503 (1993).
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H.R. 470, 53rd Leg., 1st Sess. (Idaho 1996).
320.
Id.
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provisions for mandatory attendance at counseling sessions.2 3 While
neither Idaho proposal was enacted in 1996, the movement against
unadulterated no-fault appears to be gathering steam. In the words of
State Representative Dorr, Idahoans want "some speed bumps constructed on the road to divorce." 24 In 1995 and 1996, measures to kill
3 26
32 5
or at least wound no-fault were introduced in Georgia, Hawaii,
Pennsylvania, 3 7 Virginia, 32 8 Illinois, 329 and Kansas, 330 among others.
In a sense, of course, the concept of fault has never disappeared
from spousal relationships, particularly at their breaking point.
Studies confirm that issues of moral responsibility have retained their
prominence in marital breakdowns. 31 In their study of contemporary
divorce trends, Sarat and Festiner noted that despite the legal irrelevance of culpability, "clients continue to think in fault terms and to
attribute blame to their spouse. ' 13 2 Social researchers Wallerstein and
Blakeslee made the point quite bluntly: 'What other life crisis engen-

323.

Id.

324.
Ann Scott Tyson, States Put Minor Speed Bumps in Divorce Path. No-Fault
Backlash, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 10, 1996, at 1.
325.
H.R. 30, 143rd Leg., 1st Sess. (Ga. 1995). Georgia House Bill 30 proposed
the outright repeal of no-fault divorce.
326.
H.R. 3751, 18th Leg., 1st Sess. (Haw. 1996). Hawaii House Bill 3751 similarly provided for a one-year waiting period and mandatory counseling after a divorce
filing in cases with minor children.
327.
S. 958, 179th Leg., 1st Sess. (Pa. 1995). Pennsylvania House Bill 958 would
condition a divorce upon proof that all children ages six to 16 had attended at least three
counseling sessions between the time of separation and the granting of the decree, while
1995 Pennsylvania House Bill 2003 would establish the judicial option of holding hearings in no-fault divorce cases. H.R. 2003, 179th Leg., 1st Sess. (Pa. 1995).
328.
H.R. 1188, 1996 1st Sess. (Va. 1996). Virginia House Bill 1188 would limit
the availability of divorce upon the ground of separation (the only no-fault alternative under Virginia law) to couples who have been separated for one year, have no minor children, and file jointly for the divorce.
329.
S. 1842, 89th Leg., 1st Sess. (Ill. 1996). Illinois Senate Bill 1842 would allow.
a divorce for irreconcilable differences only after a period of separation, and would require
mutual consent if the couple had been married for more than 10 years, if they had a dependent child, or if the wife was pregnant.
330.
S. 608, 76th Leg., 1st Sess. (Kan. 1996); H.R. 3002, 76th Leg., 1st Sess.
(Kan. 1996). Kansas Senate Bill 608 and Kansas House Bill 3007 would limit no-fault divorce to cases which included mutual consent and no dependent children, while 1995
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ders the wish to kill? In what other life crisis are children used as
33
bullets? 1
Divorce has always been painful, and often traumatizing. This
article has explored the history of no-fault alternatives and suggested
what the current return-to-fault movement has made clear: blameworthiness is a concept that simply cannot be disentangled from the
breakup of a marriage. There is evidence that under the fault regime
couples seeking to rebuild their lives through divorce tended to work
through their anger in negotiating their exit from a failed relationship.3 3 The "blaming" ritual of the fault era may even have a cathartic
effect. Under the current fault-free legal culture, divorce-minded
spouses may entirely disregard their partners in demanding and obtaining a divorce. But society pays a steep price. Individuals have captured the flag of families, with the result that many "bitter divorce
brawls . . .seem to be over social needs that right now can be expressed only in personal terms."35 The marital dissolution is assured,
but what were once quaintly termed the "ancillary" issues of children
and cash are now subjected to the grinder of real, adverse, gutwrenching litigation. No-fault has, in many ways, exacerbated the
3 36
pain of marital dissolution.
Recognizing the prevalence of fault should not, however, blindly
lead us to again divert divorces into the channels of cruelty, adultery,
and desertion. In the face of the overwhelming evidence presented of
the farcical nature of American society's lengthy dalliance with faultonly divorce mechanisms, 337 the conclusion that we should reinstall
the unholy trinity of fault in our divorce pantheon is untenable. Conditioning a divorce upon one spouse's epitomizing the other as an
adulterer, deserter, or beast provides not only a pathetic parody of the
complex dynamic of intense psychological relationships, but also
grossly overestimates the power of law over culture. The mightiest
law is that of necessity: couples who desire to divorce will do so.
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But divorce law is not impotent; it can require that couples who
divorce do so only after giving the matter serious reflection, and after
assuring that -an economically disadvantaged spouse and all dependent children are treated fairly. Proposals to require mutual consent,
one-to two-year periods of separation, and efforts at mediation incline
in this direction. Bills to gut no-fault divorce and return to the scarletletter milieu of proving fault are nostalgic attempts to recapture what
never was. This article's account of party, legislative, and judicial experimentation with no-fault's predecessors gifts no legal historian
with a crystal ball for the future of divorce. But if we chose to find
what we will in the historical record, we should at least be aware of
our failures in matrimonial jurisprudence both when we locked divorce in the fault closet as when we removed all the fetters from those
who would break free from marriage.

